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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, many jurisdictions have enacted legislation specifi-
cally addressing crimes committed out of "bias" or "hatred" toward
members of identifiable social groups.' So called "hate crime" statutes
typically include enhanced criminal sanctions or enforcement
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1. See 50 State Statutory Surveys: Crimes: Hate Crimes, 0030 Surveys 11 (West 2008).
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mechanisms, and are justified by legislatures on the grounds that:
(a) such crimes pose a unique social problem, and/or (b) such crimes
pose a greater social danger than similar crimes perpetrated in the ab-
sence of group-specific motivations.2 Serious questions exist about
whether these claims-particularly as they are pursued on behalf of laws
designed to punish anti-gay hate crimes-are supportable on retributiv-
ist, utilitarian, or expressivist grounds.3 Moreover, the arguments
advanced in favor of legislation designed to detect and punish crimes
motivated by anti-gay animus cohabit uneasily with existing discursive
constructions of gayness as a source of social identity. These tensions are
brought into sharp relief by the so-called "homosexual panic" defense,
which is frequently raised to counter allegations of anti-gay criminal
conduct. The homosexual panic defense plays on the unsettled nature
of the claims leveraged by gay men and lesbians on behalf of recognizing
gayness as a distinct and honorable source of identity and thus uncovers
a fundamental inconsistency in the justificatory framework that has
been developed on behalf of hate crime legislation. More importantly, it
points toward an even deeper problem embedded within the mechanism
of bias crime punishment: the reinscription of the very social dynamics
that may create the impetus for such crimes in the first place.
The interrogation of anti-gay hate crime discourse helps illustrate a
fundamental quality of law; namely, its power to constitute social real-
ity.' More specifically, I contend that law helps to constitute a predictive
matrix of sex, gender, and the body6 that limits and constrains social ex-
pressions of sexual desire and experience. The dominant narrative of
sexuality as it is expressed in law conceives of gender, sex, and the body
as categorical status descriptors that exist in determinate relationship to
one another. The resulting framework is constituted along three dimen-
sions: (a) the body is deemed divisible into two sexes (male and female);
(b) we recognize as real only two polar genders (masculine and femi-
nine); and (c) we understand there to be two categorical sexual
2. See, e.g., In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1369 n.1 (Cal. 1995).
3. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56
STAN. L. REv. 1081, 1146 (2004).
4. See generally CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN: PASSION AND FEAR
IN THE CRIMINAL COURTROOM (2003); Gary D. Comstock, Dismantling the Homo-
sexual Panic Defense, 2 LAw & SEXUALITY 81 (1992).
5. See generally JOHN M. CONLEY & WILLIAM O'BARR, JUST WORDS: LAW, LANGUAGE, &
POWER (1st ed. 1998); CONSTITUTIVE CRIMINOLOGY AT WORIC APPLICATIONS TO
CRIME AND JUSTICE (Stuart Henry & Dragan Milovanovic eds., 1999); ALAN HUNT,
EXPLORATIONS IN LAW AND SocIETY: TOWARD A CONSTITUTIVE THEORY OF LAW
(1993); Yvonne Zylan, States of Passion: Law, Identity, and Discourses of Desire
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
6. See Zylan, supra note 5, chs. 1-3.
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orientations (heterosexual and homosexual). Those binaries thus estab-
lished, the matrix further establishes that if one is able to locate a
relevant subject or object at the intersection of two of the categories, one
will be able to locate his or her placement in the third category. The
categories are discreet, dichotomous, and rigidly relational.
As a result of their institutional mandates and practices, courts en-
gage in the sort of predictive work enabled by the binary matrix as a
matter of course. Consequently, I will argue, anti-gay hate crime laws
result in the production of specific discursive objects (doctrine and ar-
gument) within a specific set of institutional practices that legitimate
these limiting narratives in part by establishing the targets of the law's
intervention as (to use Jurgen Habermas's term) the "authors"7 of their
own normative constraints. We desire the law's discipline and the law
does not disappoint us.
How, precisely, do we signal our desire for law's discipline? Cer-
tainly there are cases of individual actors who, through bad luck or
happenstance, find themselves in the position of making a claim upon
the juridical state and thus invoking its power to define and create nar-
ratives of sexuality and identity. More frequently, however, such claims
are pressed via the strategic interventions of lesbian, gay, and bisexual
(LGB) social movement organizations (SMOs)." It is indisputable that
there has been a distinct turn toward legalism among such organiza-
tions, and few would contest the claim that such SMOs are acting
intentionally, tactically, and strategically with respect to their deploy-
ment of legal doctrine and argument.! Consequently, I think it
7. JoRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 33 (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996)
(1992).
8. Social movement organizations are relatively formalized collective actors contesting
social, legal, and/or political norms. There is a rich literature of long standing within
political sociology that examines social movements as organizational entities. See gen-
erally, e.g., COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS: POLITICAL
OPPORTUNITIES, MOBILIZING STRUCTURES, AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS (Doug
McAdam et al. eds., 1996); SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND ORGANIZATION THEORY (Ge-
rald Davis et al. eds., 2005); MAYER ZALD & JOHN MCCARTHY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IN AN ORGANIZATIONAL SOCIETY: COLLECTED ESSAYS (1987).
9. See generally, e.g., LEFr LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE (Wendy Brown & Janet E. Halley
eds., 2002). Nor should one feel compelled to contest it. Legal "wings" of SMOs are
organized for precisely such purposes: to change formal legal institutions and doctrine
to advance the aims of their foundational organizations and (more importantly) those
organizations' social and political constituencies. What follows is not a critique of
what such legal arms of SMOs do, nor an attack on how they do it. Indeed, such enti-
ties use the tools at their disposal in skillful and thoughtful ways, and they frequently
achieve their stated objectives in spite of great resistance and limited resources. In
fact, I would argue that they are quite good at what they do. My critique is pitched at
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important to examine which legal interventions have been pursued by
LGB activists and what, precisely, constitutes the discursive terrain that
has been produced as a function of this pursuit. In this Article, I seek to
explore questions such as: how does law take up claims made by these
collective actors and transform these claims in ways that may be both
empowering and limiting? What sorts of justificatory narratives and
claims about sexuality, the body, and desire are "put into discourse" as a
result of the claims advanced by LGB activists? How do the claims and
arguments offered in response by countermovement organizations di-
vert, contextualize, and/or transform these discursive objects? In short,
how does this set of processes produce a specific regime of sexual truth?
The inquiry is made somewhat less complex by the fact that there
appears to be a high degree of consistency across the agendas of most
national- and state-level LGB community and movement organizations.
A review of the websites of the Human Rights Campaign, the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, the ACLU's Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and
Transgender Project, the National Center for Lesbian Rights, and
Lambda Legal, for example, demonstrates that each is working on most
or all of the same issues: same-sex marriage, hate crime legislation,
workplace discrimination, healthcare and/or HIV treatment and preven-
tion, transgender rights, parenting, protection of LGB youth and elders,
immigration, and the status of LGB people serving in the military.'o
'While most of these issues reside primarily in civil law, one-hate
crime legislation-directly and notably implicates the criminal justice
a broader level of analysis. As should become clear, I question the wisdom of pursu-
ing legalistic strategies in the first place-particularly where the objectives are
primarily expressive in nature. And I do so through an examination of the unin-
tended (and often unmarked) discursive effects that flow inevitably from law as a set
of specific institutional practices.
10. See Am. Civil Liberties Union: Lesbian & Gay Rights, http://www.aclu.org/lgbt/
index.html (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); Human Rights Campaign: The Issues,
http://www.hrc.org/issues/index.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); Lambda Legal
Homepage, http://www.lambdalegal.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2009); Nat'1 Center for
Lesbian Rights: Issues & Cases Overview, http://www.nclrights.org/site/PageServer?
pagename=issue_overview (last visited Feb. 4, 2009); Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task
Force: The Issues, http://www.thetaskforce.org/issues (last visited Feb. 4, 2009).
There are, of course, significant differences across these organizations in terms of em-
phasis, and some tackle issues that are not listed here. For example, the NCLR has
recently become particularly involved in fighting discrimination against lesbians in
sports, and NGLTF lists Racial and Economic Justice as a primary issue on its
agenda. However, it is incontestable that some issues-particularly marriage, work-
place discrimination, and hate crimes-appear to occupy a place of prominence
across a wide array of LGB organizations.
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system." As such, it is contested on a different juridical field-one
marked by a specific set of jurisprudential rules and a more demanding
set of justificatory burdens than the field of civil litigation. These fea-
tures render the pursuit of anti-hate crime legislation more than just a
particularly important part of the LGB legislative agenda; they also serve
to produce particularly vexing discursive effects with respect to the pre-
dictive binary matrix of sex, gender, and the body. In positing a
conception of desire that depends discursively upon its "inverse" (ani-
mus), and which must be proven through an evidentiary inquiry that
begins and ends with categorical identity distinctions, anti-gay hate
crime legislation is an especially troubling socio-legal construct. It thus
warrants particularly close scrutiny.
This Article proceeds as follows. In Part II, I catalog the history of
anti-gay hate crime laws in the United States, describing the rapid
spread of state-level laws extending race- and religion-based hate crime
laws to LGB people. I also provide an overview of federal legislation ad-
dressing anti-gay hate crime. In Part III, I examine the policy
environment within which anti-gay hate crime laws have been, and con-
tinue to be, considered.12 Specifically, I analyze the jurisprudential
frameworks that shape, define, and constrain discourses of equality,
rights, and social identity. I argue that the policy environment of anti-
gay hate crime law has created a set of intractable discursive problems
for advocates of anti-gay hate crime laws. Such laws' emphasis upon
status categories in defining the harm, and the causation scheme impli-
cated by hate crime tracking mechanisms and sentence enhancements,
serves to undermine LGB discourses of equality and sexual freedom, and
reinscribes binary conceptions of sex, gender, and embodied desire. In
Part IV, I unpack the justificatory discourses embedded within the drive
to enact and extend anti-gay hate crime laws. I demonstrate that utilitar-
ian, expressivist, and retributivist discourses circulate in troubling ways
throughout the anti-gay hate crime debate. Such justificatory narratives
betray a fundamental ambivalence about the nature of sexuality, identity,
and desire and, as a result, open the door to juridical investigations into,
and evaluations of, different manifestations of passion. I argue in Part V
11. Of course, the fight to repeal sodomy laws-the criminalization of gayness per se-
was, until very recently, at the top of many of these organizations' agendas. With the
issuance of the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558
(2003), however, that battle has (at least for now) been won.
12. A policy environment consists of the discourses, actors, and institutional processes
that emerge from preexisting social and legal policies and which constitute the terrain
upon which subsequent policies may be considered and acted upon. See generally
Yvonne Zylan, Maternalism Redefined: Gender, the State, and the Politics of Day Care,
1945-62, 14 GENDER & Soc'Y 608 (2000).
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that sexual progressives ought to be suspicious of such investigations in
part because they create the discursive space within which anti-gay dis-
courses-such as that which authorizes the so-called "homosexual panic
defense"-flourish. I conclude the Article in Part VI by considering the
implications of my analysis of anti-gay hate crime laws for LGB advo-
cacy generally.
Before proceeding to the substance of my argument, I should ex-
plain my use of the phrase LGB in lieu of the more common LGBT
throughout this Article. My exclusion of transgendered people from this
discussion is neither accidental nor meant as a political slight. The po-
litical dimensions of transgendered identity are, to my mind,
distinguishable from those associated with gay and lesbian identity in at
least one sense important for my argument. That is, the asserted rela-
tionship between biological imperatives and social strictures operates in
an almost perfectly inverse fashion for each group: whereas many trans-
gendered people claim they are engaged in a struggle to bring their
external, material selves into conformity with their internally fixed gen-
ders, the dominant narrative of gay and lesbian identity contends that
gayness evinces an unmooring of sexual attraction from the strictures of
gender determinism.13 Desire, in the gay/lesbian identity narrative, re-
bels against the rules set out by a gender dimorphic culture." In the
transgendered identity narrative, desire operates with studied reference to
such rules. This difference is consequential, for reasons that will become
clear as I proceed.
11. THE SHORT (BUT Busy) HISTORY OF ANTI-GAY
HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
Hate crime legislation is a legal instrument of relatively recent vin-
tage, and it is only since the early 1990s that state and federal
jurisdictions have enacted laws that specifically target crimes committed
13. See generally HENRY RUBIN, SELF-MADE MEN: IDENTITY AND EMBODIMENT AMONG
TRANSSEXUAL MEN (2003) (discussing the construction of transgendered and trans-
sexual identities).
14. Zylan, supra note 5, ch. 3. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMI-
NISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY (1st ed. 1990) (articulating a performative
theory of sex, gender and the body and de-naturalizing the connections between
them); f LEO BERSANI, HOMos 3-7, 55-64 (1995) (critiquing post-identitarian
claims such as Butler's as insufficiently attentive to sexuality and the body, but em-
bracing a notion of a specifically gay desire that is a "cultural achievement").
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out of "bias" or "hatred" toward gay, lesbian, and bisexual people."
However, once it began, the pace of adoption of anti-gay hate crime"
legislation was impressive; currently 31 states and the District of Co-
lumbia have some sort of anti-gay hate crime statute on the books."
15. JAMES B. JACOBS & KIMBERLY POTTER, HATE CRIMES: CRIMINAL LAW AND IDENTITY
POLITICS 29-44 (2000); VALERIE JENNESS & RYKEN GRATTET, MAKING HATE A
CRIME: FROM SoCIAL MOVEMENT TO LAW ENFORCEMENT 20-32 (2004). The spe-
cific language of these statutes varies considerably. Some emphasize victim selection
on the basis of sexual orientation, while others refer explicitly to commission of the
crime "because of" the victim's sexual orientation. Several scholars have attempted to
develop meaningful conceptual schemes to help make sense of these variations. See
generally HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE AGAINST LESBIANS AND GAY MEN
(Gregory M. Herek & Keven T. Berrill eds.) (1992) (hereinafter HATE CRIMES:
CONFRONTING VIOLENCE]; JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 15; VALERIE JENNESS &
KENDAL BROAD, HATE CRIMES: NEW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE POLITICS OF
VIOLENCE 36-46 (1997). While these differences are important in many respects, it is
also true that, regardless of whether the emphasis is on the motivation behind victim
selection or the motivation behind the underlying crime itself, all such statutes invite
an inquiry into what I will refer to broadly as "causation." I have elsewhere addressed
the "discriminatory selection" variant of causation requirement, finding that similar
dynamics prevail. Yvonne Zylan, Finding the Sex in Sexual Harassment: How Title VII
and Tort Schemes Miss the Point of Same-Sex Hostile Environment Harassment, 39
MICH. J. L. REFORM 391, 404-12 (2006).
16. The phrasing here is grammatically awkward. "Anti-gay hate crime law" could mean
a hate crime law that is anti-gay, or a law that prohibits anti-gay hate crimes. I mean
the latter when I use the phrase here, echoing the usage that has become conventional
among scholars and activists.
17. Nat'l Gay & Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crime Laws in the United States (July 2008),
http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/issue-maps/hate-crimes-7_08-color
.pdf. How, why, and when states enact anti-gay hate crime laws is an important and
intriguing research question in itself. See, for example, JENNESS & GRATTET, supra
note 15, who argue that the process results from social movement activism respond-
ing to the increased, or perceived increase, in incidents of anti-gay hate crime and
that hate crime laws diffuse mimetically-that is, that the enactment of hate crime
laws follows a pattern of isomorphic diffusion across spatially proximate jurisdictions.
Diffusion does appear to be at work in accelerating the passage of anti-gay hate crime
laws during the 1990s. However, in their analysis of the enactment of all forms of
criminal hate crime laws (not just those including sexual orientation as a protected
classification), Soule and Earl find evidence of a more complex, heteromorphic proc-
ess of diffusion, and identify several intrastate factors of importance as well (including
partisanship, per capita income, and a jurisdiction's overall innovativeness). See Sarah
A. Soule & Jennifer Earl, The Enactment ofState-Level Hate Crime Law in the United
States: Intrastate and Interstate Factors, 44 Soc. PERSP. 281, 297-300 (2001). Soule
and Earl contend that criminal hate crime laws-while diffusing rapidly-
nonetheless demonstrate a complex pattern of adoption, where states in the same re-
gion may actually be less likely to adopt criminal hate crime laws where a region-mate
has already done so. Id. Indeed, there is evidence that the relative publicity associated
with passage of hate crime laws may have led some jurisdictions to resist adopting
criminal hate crime laws-particularly where they had already adopted civil hate
crime laws or tracking laws. Id.
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Such laws vary considerably across jurisdictions, but those which modify
the criminal law18 typically do one or more of the following things:
(a) create tracking mechanisms designed to collect data on incidents of
anti-gay hate crime;" (b) create special enforcement mechanisms, such
as vesting jurisdiction over anti-gay hate crimes in federal law enforce-
20 21ment authorities;20 and/or (c) mandate enhanced criminal sanctions
beyond those which would be imposed for similar crimes committed
without the attendant bias or hatred. These different mechanisms re-
quire different kinds and levels of state intervention into social and
institutional relationships, as well as different levels of resources ex-
pended in the effort to combat anti-gay crime. Tracking mechanisms,
for example, require little institutional innovation. Federal law enforce-
ment is simply directed to collect data from local law enforcement, and
the federal government expends few resources in assisting local authori-
ties in improving their own data collection efforts.22 The FBI provides
some guidance to local law enforcement in how to determine whether
crimes ought to be characterized as hate-motivated or not, but its guide-
lines are broad, non-specific, and necessarily delegate the lion's share of
discretionary judgment to the officers on the street.23
Sentence enhancements, on the other hand, intervene deeply in lo-
cal law enforcement institutions. Particularly where enhancements are
mandatory and of general application (i.e., where they require additional
18. There are civil laws authorizing suits for damages against perpetrators of hate crimes
in many jurisdictions, as well. Soule & Earl, supra note 17, at 283-84.
19. See, e.g., Hate Crime Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275 (1990); IND. CODE §§ 10-
13-3-1, 10-13-3-38 (2008); MICH. COMP. LAws § 2 8.257a (2008).
20. This is what the most recent legislation-known as the Matthew Shepard Act-
would have done. See, e.g., Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes
Prevention Act of 2007, H.R. 1592, 110th Cong. (2007); CONG. REc. S 1105 (daily
ed. Apr. 12, 2007), S4437 (introduced); CONG. REc. H2743 (daily ed. March 20,
2007) (introduced). The bill was passed as a stand-alone measure by the House in
2007, and was passed as an amendment to a defense spending bill later that same
year. Resistance was organized to the amendment however, and it was ultimately
stripped from the spending bill. See Anne Flaherty, Congress Drops Legislation to Cover
Gays in Hate Crimes, AssOCIATED PRESs, as reprinted in CHI. TRIB., Dec. 7, 2007, at
14; Human Rights Campaign, The Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention
Act / Matthew Shepard Act, http://www.hrc.org/laws-and-elections/5660.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2009).
21. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE %§ 422.6-422.76; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAw %§ 10-
301, 10-304, 10-306, 10-307.
22. See, e.g., Rory McVeigh, Michael R. Welch & Thoroddur Bjarnason, Hate Crime
Reporting as a Successful Social Movement Outcome, 68 Am. Soc. REv. 843, 843-45
(2003) (analyzing the Hate Crimes Statistics Act).
23. Id. at 845-46. See also, e.g., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTING PROGRAM, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, HATE CRIME STATISTICS 2005 (2006), available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/
hc2005/.
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penalties upon a finding of hate/bias crime liability for any crime) ,24 the
enactment of hate crime sentencing laws can dramatically alter the prac-
tices of police officers, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and courts.25
Needless to say, the introduction of such laws is also likely to have a
dramatic impact on victims and defendants.
Because it might lead to prosecution of some alleged anti-gay hate
crimes that would otherwise be ignored by local law enforcement, the
extension of federal jurisdiction over hate crime investigation and prose-
cution probably occupies a middle ground: more interventionist than
tracking mechanisms, but less interventionist than sentence enhance-
ments. The most recent congressional bill proposing such a measure-
the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crime Prevention Act (the "Matthew
Shepard Act")2 6-Would have allowed the Justice Department to assist
local law enforcement in investigating and/or prosecuting an alleged
hate crime, but would not have required it.27 The bill also promised
some amount of resource distribution to local law enforcement for train-
ing and/or investigation,28 although it would likely not have been
enough to dramatically alter the existing practices of local authorities.
Despite these differences in levels of interventionism, however, each
of these approaches raises significant political, jurisprudential, and
normative questions. This is because anti-gay hate crime laws, in invok-
ing the power of the criminal justice system, require a particularly sturdy
defense. Application of the criminal law to punish wrongdoing must be
well justified because such punishment involves the deployment of the
coercive, and often violent, power of the state against its citizens.29 In a
Habermasian sense, the application of the criminal law raises particularly
24. JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 93.
25. See Kevin T. Berrill & Gregory M. Herek, Primary and Secondary Victimization in
Anti-Gay Hate Crimes: Official Response and Public Policy, in HATE CRIMES: CON-
FRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 289, 289-99. As Jenness and Grattet
demonstrate, there is wide variation among hate crime statutes with respect to how
sentence enhancements are determined and applied, as well as to which crimes they
may attach. See JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 73-101.
26. Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act, H.R. 1592,
S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced in House, Mar. 20, 2007).
27. I do not wish to understate the significance of the proposed legislation. Because
criminal law is understood to be one of the core areas reserved to the jurisdiction of
the states, any effort to modify jurisdiction in this way represents a significant depar-
ture.
28. Matthew Shepard Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act, H.R. 1592,
S. 1105, 110th Cong. (2007) (as introduced in House, Mar. 20, 2007).
29. See generally MAx WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE
SOCIOLOGY (1978).
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challenging legitimation problems for the state because it signals an es-
pecially traumatic and violent incursion into the life-world.o
Because sentence enhancements pose particularly vexing questions
of legitimacy, they have been the focus of much of the extensive schol-
arly and political work undertaken in support of hate crimes
legislation.31 As a result, such arguments constitute the heart of the dis-
cursive field produced in and around the legal definition of anti-gay
hatred. If we examine closely the arguments advanced by scholars, cause
lawyers,32 and SMOs in seeking to justify the institutional commitment
to tracking and meting out enhanced punishment for anti-gay hate
crimes, however, we see that the justifications proffered in support of
anti-gay hate crime sentence enhancements intersect in troubling ways
with existing discourses of sexuality, identity, and equality.
The perilous contours of anti-gay hate crime discourse result, in
part, from the mixed quality of most criminal law discourse in the
United States-taking, as it does, an approach that pulls together ele-
ments of retributivism, utilitarianism, and expressivism (with just a hint
of rehabilitationism).33 But they are also the product of the bracketing
functions produced by the doctrinal environment within which identity
claims are processed by American law-in particular the environment
constructed by Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence. As a conse-
quence, claims made about the nature of anti-gay hate crime cohabit
uneasily with existing discursive constructions of gayness as a source of
social identity. These tensions are brought into sharp relief by the so-
called "homosexual panic" defense, which is frequently raised to counter
allegations of anti-gay criminal conduct." As I describe below, the ho-
mosexual panic defense plays on the unsettled nature of the claims
leveraged by LGB advocates on behalf of recognizing gayness as a dis-
tinct and honorable source of identity. In so doing, it points toward a
30. See HABERMAS, supra note 7, at 25-27.
31. See generally, e.g., Berrill & Herek, supra note 25; Linda Garnets, Gregory M. Herek
& Barrie Levy, Violence and Victimization of Lesbian and Gay Men: Mental Health
Consequences, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 207; In-
troduction, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 1; see also
JENNESS & GRATTET, Supra note 15; FREDERICK LAWRENCE, PUNISHING HATE: BIAS
CRIMES UNDER AMERICAN LAW (1999) (justifying hate crime laws in general); Paul
Iganski, Hate Crimes Hurt More, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 626 (2001); Jack McDe-
vitt et al., Consequences for Victims: A Comparison of Bias- and Non-Bias-Motivated
Assaults, 45 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 697 (2001).
32. See generally CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RE-
SPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat & Stuart A. Scheingold eds., 1998).
33. For retributivist, expressivist, and utilitarian justifications for criminal punishment,
see generally FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW (Leo Katz et al. eds., 1999).
34. See In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1369 n.1 (Cal. 1995).
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worrying consequence of the mechanism of hate crime punishment: in
defining "hatred" in a legally meaningful fashion, hate crime laws may
serve to reinscribe the very social dynamics that create the impetus for
such crimes in the first place.
111. THE POLICY ENVIRONMENT OF ANTI-GAY
HATE CRIME LEGISLATION
As Valerie Jenness and Ryken Grattet have persuasively demon-
strated, the history of anti-gay hate crime legislation is best characterized
as a story of the political and legal construction of a social problem.35
That is, while there is evidence that LGB people have been the objects
of violence and intimidation for at least as long as recorded LGB history,
it is only very recently that the law and public policy have identified
something one could call "anti-gay violence." According to Jenness and
Grattet, it was the confluence of the civil rights, victims' rights, and
LGB rights movements in the 1960s-80s that created the discursive and
cultural conditions within which anti-gay hate crime could be identified
as such, and a movement to combat anti-gay hate crime could emerge
and seek policy changes at the state and federal level." By 1990, these
efforts had achieved what most scholars and activists count as a signifi-
cant victory: inclusion of LGB people as a protected group under the
newly enacted Hate Crime Statistics Act.
The inclusion of gay people did not come without a fight, however,
and the content of that legislative battle begins to suggest how the justi-
ficatory claims advanced in support of anti-gay hate crime legislation
have created certain discursive formations that should be disconcerting
to advocates of LGB equality. Conservatives in both houses of Congress
hotly contested the inclusion of "sexual orientation" in the pending
Hate Crime Statistics Bill." Some argued that requiring the tracking of
anti-gay violence would increase the cost of the measure." Others, how-
ever, had jurisprudence (of a sort) on their minds. According to Jenness
and Grattet, "the primary objection to the inclusion of sexual orienta-
tion in the [Hate Crimes Statistics Act (HCSA)] was that the federal
government should not provide gays and lesbians with 'special rights'
35. JENNESS & GRAT-rET, supra note 15, at 2; see also JENNESS & BROAD, supra note 15, at
5-7; McVeigh et al., supra note 22, at 844.
36. JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, ch. 2.
37. Id. at 44.
38. JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 58; see also JACOBS & PorrER, supra note 15, at
70-71; Berrill & Herek, supra note 25, at 292.
39. JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 58.
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and that to do so would render violence against gays and lesbians
equivalent to violence against racial, ethnic, and religious minorities. 40
The invocation of the phrase "special rights" is significant here, as
are two key amendments of the bill: one which replaced the phrase "sex-
ual orientation" with the phrase "homosexuality or heterosexuality" and
a second which created a new section of the bill designed to expressly
preclude an interpretation of the HCSA that would extend antidis-
crimination protection to LGB people.4' A third amendment-which
added a conspicuous and graceless provision reinforcing the Congress'
belief that "the [sic] American family life is the foundation of American
society" and, "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed ... to promote or
encourage homosexuality"42-presaged efforts to proactively limit the
extension of the state's recognition of LGB people from becoming its
recognition of LGB relationshps.
On the surface, one might view these amendments and rhetorical
strategies as simply the tried and true methods of cultural conservatives
seeking to derail any legislation designed to advance the status of LGB
people, or as incidental measures that left the key component of the
44bill-its application to anti-gay hate crime-intact. Certainly, one
Congressman's complaint that the phrase "sexual orientation" was an
"ambiguous" protected classification that might require the FBI to track
40. Id.
41. Various statutory construction provisions were added to the bill along the way, be-
ginning with "Nothing in this Act creates a right for an individual to bring an action
complaining of discrimination based on homosexuality." H.R. 1048, 101st Cong.
§ 2(b) (1989) (as passed by House, June 27, 1989), 135 CONG. REc. 13,541 (1989).
The provision ultimately took the following form:
Nothing in this section creates a cause of action or a right to bring an ac-
tion, including an action based on discrimination due to sexual
orientation. As used in this section, the term 'sexual orientation' means
consensual homosexuality or heterosexuality. This subsection does not
limit any existing cause of action or right to bring an action, including any
action under the Administrative Procedure Act or the All Writs Act.
H.R. 1048, 101st Cong. § 1(b)(3) (1990) (enacted), 136 CONG. REc. 6329 (1990).
42. See H.R. 1048, 101st Cong. § 2(a)(1), (b) (1990), 136 CONG. REc. 6329 (1990)
(discussing H.R. 1048 as amended by the Senate).
43. It is worth noting here the seemingly ubiquitous tethering of all things gay to the
specter of same-sex marriage in contemporary sexual politics.
44. Jenness and Grattet appear to adhere to this latter interpretation, stating, "In the end,
discursive moves that expand the domain of the law in ways that are fundamentally
consistent with the qualities and characteristics of previously recognized legal subjects
or previously legitimated and institutionalized legal terrain proved successful, in both
the immediate and subsequent legislative efforts." JENNESS & GRATrET, supra note 15,
at 62.
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hate crimes perpetrated against "child molesters"" was grounded not in
any reasonable theory of statutory interpretation but, rather, in a famil-
iar kind of old school anti-gay rhetoric. 6 Yet approaching the issue in
this way precludes an examination of why this particular strategy was
deployed and why it was at least partly successful. The two statutory
amendments, as well as the legislative record-while leaving LGB peo-
ple in the catalog of those against whom hate crimes would be
recognized and tracked via the HCSA-signaled the emergence of sev-
eral discursive inconsistencies and difficulties.
A. The Discursive Environment ofAnti-gay Hate Crime Laws: Equal
Protection Analysis, Title VII, and "Special Rights"
To understand why this is so, it is necessary to take a brief detour
through the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the
Civil Rights Act of 1964-two provisions that were frequently invoked
and conflated by opponents of the inclusion of "sexual orientation" in
the HCSA and which, in any event, make up the crucial dimensions of
the discursive and institutional environment within which LGB legal
activism was operating in the 1990s.
The Fourteenth Amendment-which guarantees protection of the
"privileges and immunities" of citizenship, and mandates the "equal pro-
tection of the laws" and "due process of law"-is one of three
constitutional amendments that was passed in the immediate aftermath
of the Civil War. Along with the Thirteenth Amendment (which abol-
ished slavery) and the Fifteenth Amendment (which guaranteed voting
rights to all Americans, regardless of race), the Fourteenth Amendment
was enacted to rectify the most expressly racist dimensions of the Con-
stitution-those that authorized slavery, identified black Americans as
not fully human, and restricted the right to vote to white Americans."
Yet the language of the Amendments-particularly the Fourteenth-is
45. 134 CONG. REc. 11,405 (1988), cited in JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 60.
46. The rhetorical equation of gay sexuality and bestiality appears, thankfully, to be on
the decline. Indeed, in a 2004 interview, Reverend Jerry Fallwell-prominent Evan-
gelical Christian minister, fervent opponent of gay rights and a big fan of the "if gay
rights now, whither bestiality?" rhetorical parry-felt compelled to deny his own pre-
vious efforts to equate homosexuality with bestiality. See Posting to Media Matters of
America's County Fair blog, Falwell Denied His Habit of Comparing Homosexuality to
Bestiality, Crack Addiction, http://mediamatters.org/items/200
4 11080004 (Nov. 8,
2004, 13:13 EST).
47. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-77 (1st Perennial Classics ed. 2002); LAWRENCE A. FRIEDMAN, A HIsToRY OF
AMERICAN LAW 257 (3d ed. 2005).
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characteristically broad and subject to varying interpretations, leaving
scholars, jurists, and activists plenty to work with as they attempt to es-
tablish (or deny) constitutional grounds for combating many different
forms of social inequality."
For our purposes, one question that has long plagued the federal
courts is especially critical: given its provenance, ought the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause be interpreted to apply only to
state practices that implicate racial classifications, or should it be given a
broader application, given the plain, expansive language of the text?
Different rules and standards governing Equal Protection analysis have
evolved over time, but it is now well established that race occupies a spe-
cial place in Equal Protection jurisprudence.o As a general matter, racial
classifications provoke the strictest scrutiny by the courts as they deter-
mine whether a given state action comports with the Equal Protection
48. A prior question in all of the debates that arise around the Reconstruction Amend-
ments (and most, if not all, constitutional issues) is just how broad, ambiguous,
and/or subject to interpretation the language of the text really is. That question is en-
tirely too enormous to cover here, and is in any case beside the point. Whether one
adopts an originalist textualist position (such as the kind espoused by Justice Antonin
Scalia, see generally ANTONIN ScAIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAw (1998)), or a more consequentialist view (such as that ad-
vanced by Justice Stephen Breyer, see generally STEPHEN G. BREYER, ACTIvE LIBERTY:
INTERPRETING A DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005), or, even more so, by political
theorist Sotirios Barber, see generally SOTIRIous A. BARBER, WELFARE AND THE CON-
STITUTION (2003)), there is interpretive work that must be done in any Fourteenth
Amendment case that comes before the Court. For example, one cannot make sense
of the phrase "[nlo state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws," U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1, without resort to some prior
conception of what "equal" means-in a metaphysical, political, social, and/or mate-
rial sense. Surely, not every law must treat every person the same-how, then, to
justify the tax code? Or laws that regulate the conduct of doctors and lawyers and
pharmacists in ways that average citizens are not regulated? The Constitution does
not contain an appendix of definitions of words like "equal" to help courts and citi-
zens identify the legally significant dimensions of equality. Thus, one must resort to
some extratextual understanding of the word "equal" to make sense of the Fourteenth
Amendment's mandate. It is in this extrarextual space that all the fun, nuance, and
deadly serious and important work occurs.
49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 47, at 257-60.
50. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. vs. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct.
2738 (2007); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995); Regents of the
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). How the Court conceives of race varies in these decisions. For example, the
Court has struggled with the question of whether racial classifications that privilege
non-whites over whites ought to be subject to the same level and kind of scrutiny as
those that privilege whites over non-whites. In each case, however, the Court has reit-
erated its belief that racial classifications raise at least a prima facie equal protection
issue.
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guarantee of the Constitution. Most other social classifications-
including gender, social class, and sexual identity-fail to provoke the
same level of scrutiny by the courts." Still, those working to combat
gender and sexual inequality have managed to obtain some (limited)
traction in their efforts to ground legal challenges to sexist and anti-gay
state practices in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection guaran-
tee. 52 Indeed, during the early 1980s, many activists and legal scholars
firmly believed that gender would soon be identified by the United
States Supreme Court as a second suspect classification, on par with race
as a legal category deserving the strictest scrutiny in cases alleging Equal
Protection violations." They were wrong, as it turned out, but in 1990
(when the HCSA was being debated) the matter had not yet been en-
tirely settled."
Arguably, one reason federal courts have struggled to formulate a
coherent approach to Equal Protection analysis implicating questions of
gender- and sexuality-based inequality (among others)," is that running
51. However, those statutory classifications that touch upon "fundamental rights" often
do invite strict scrutiny-but this analysis is pursued under what has become known
as the Court's "substantive due process" jurisprudence, not Equal Protection analysis.
See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); see also infra note 54.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
53. See JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LoST THE ERA ch. 6 (1986).
54. Arguably, the nail in the coffin of strict judicial scrutiny of gender distinctions did
not come until 1996, when the Court enunciated an intermediate standard of review
for gender-based equal protection claims. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-34; id. at
567-74 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (using the term "intermediate scrutiny"). But while
equal protection strategies remained at least theoretically viable as of 1990, one legal
strategy that did seem to be foreclosed to LGB advocates focused on the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Some advocates of LGB equality had hoped to
leverage the Court's "substantive due process" jurisprudence-particularly its articu-
lation of a right to privacy-to strike down anti-gay laws. Cases such as Roe v. Wade,
Stanley v. Georgia, and Griswold v. Connecticut, seem to have established the Court's
recognition of a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, within which one could
pursue one's liberty interests without state interference. However, in 1986, the Court
dashed these hopes when it held in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191 (1986),
that there was no constitutional "right to engage in homosexual sodomy" and rejected
a Fourteenth Amendment Due Process challenge to state sodomy statutes. The deci-
sion in Bowers makes clear the importance of issue framing in judicial opinions. Had
the issue been framed as whether there was a constitutional right to sexual privacy
(rather than sodomy), the Court's desired outcome would have been quite difficult to
square with the holdings of Griswold, Roe, and Stanley.
55. My interest here is in gender and sexuality, but clearly religion, socio-economic class,
disability, and what is often termed "alienage" are among the other classifications that
raise similarly difficult jurisprudential questions.
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alongside the constitutional questions posed by social inequality are a
series of statutory questions that echo similar themes. Partly in response
to the Supreme Court's crabbed interpretation of the Reconstruction
Amendments, and in the face of unprecedented racial unrest and social
movement activism," in 1964 Congress passed, and President Lyndon
Johnson signed, the 1964 Civil Rights Act: a landmark piece of legisla-
tion that became the cornerstone of American antidiscrimination law. At
its inception, the Civil Rights Act was-like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment before it-plainly focused on racial discrimination; other forms of
social inequality had not yet been folded into the discourse of "civil
rights."" However, even as early as 1964, some well placed feminist state
actors were prepared to claim that gender-based discrimination was
analogous to racial discrimination and, accordingly, should also be pro-
hibited by federal law.9 Whether as a result of clever lobbying and
positioning by these state-based feminists, or because of an error in cal-
culation by the white Southern Congressman who many believed
introduced the Amendment in an effort to kill the entire bill, "sex" was
included as a protected classification in Title VII (the employment non-
discrimination provision of the bill) when it emerged in its final
-60
version.
Despite its early inclusion, however, "sex" as a protected Tide VII
classification has long occupied an unsettled status. Courts that have
found themselves readily capable of dismissing race-based classifications
as being grounded in indefensible (or at least anachronistic) notions of
race as a social, psychological, or biological category remain hesitant to
dismiss all generalizations about gender as equally wrongheaded. 62 And
sexual orientation remains entirely excluded from protection under Title
56. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
57. See ALDON D. MORRIS, THE ORIGINS OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT: BLACK
COMMUNITIES ORGANIZING FOR CHANGE ch. 2 (1986); DOUG McADAM, FREEDOM
SUMMER ch. 2 (1988).
58. On the articulation of gender and sexual orientation-based civil rights discourses, see
generally JOHN D'EMILIo, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES (1983); SARA
EVANS, PERSONAL POLITICS: THE ROOTS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT AND THE NEW LEFT (1980); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL
JUSTICE ch. 6 (1994); McADAM, supra note 57, ch. 3.
59. Jo FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 28-43 (1975); see also CYN-
THIA HARRISON, ON ACCOUNT OF SEX: THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S ISSUES, 1945-68
146-48 (1988).
60. HARRISON, supra note 59, at 176-79.
61. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
62. HARRISON, supra note 59, at 182-91.
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VII,6 3 although it is listed as a protected classification in many state-level
antidiscrimination laws modeled on Title VII."
At the heart of the reluctance of courts and legislatures to extend
antidiscrimination protection to women and sexual minorities is the
contested character of the notion of "equality" when applied to gender
and sexuality. Where gender is concerned, the debate within American
feminism over whether "equal" means "same" or, alternatively, "different,
but equitable" is of long standing. Unpacked, this question spawns
only more questions: what is the status of the body in shaping women's
political, social, and legal status? Do biological differences between men
and women "matter" in a socio-legal sense? Should they? What does the
law mean when it speaks of "gender" and "sex"?6 Are these the same
meanings that operate politically or socially? Is gender an innate charac-
teristic, or is it something that is achieved or enacted?67 Is "woman" an
intelligible concept of political subjectivity?68 Each of these questions is,
in a sense, prior to any Title VII gender discrimination inquiry, and yet
one could, I think, fairly characterize the answers currently provided by
case law (and theory) as either non-existent or, at best, provisional.
While appearing to define "equality," antidiscrimination case law brack-
ets the most difficult and essential questions one ought to answer-or at
least pose-in order to produce an intelligible definition of the term.
Where sexuality is concerned, the troubles only deepen and multi-
ply. Is sexuality a status (like race, like gender), or is it a quality of
conduct? In other words, is it what you are, or what you do? If it is con-
duct, then it begins to look a lot less like the legal conceptions of race
63. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). Courts have also refused to read sexual orientation as
an implied protected category under Title VII. See Williamson v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., 876 F.2d 69 (8th Cir. 1989); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523
U.S. 75 (1998).
64. See, e.g., CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12940 (West 2005); HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN, THE
STATE OF THE WORKPLACE FOR LESBIAN, GAY, BIsEXuAL, AND TRANSGENDERED
AMERICANS 16-17 (2000).
65. The question has plagued First, Second, and even Third Wave feminists. See gener-
ally, HARRISON, supra note 59; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST
THEORY OF THE STATE (1989); To BE REAL: TELLING THE TRUTH AND CHANGING
THE FACE OF FEMINISM (Rebecca Walker ed., 1995).
66. See generally JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: How AND WHy To TAKE A BREAK
FROM FEMINISM (2006) (arguing for a consideration of "sex" as a legal and social con-
cept that is not reducible to "gender"); MACKINNON, supra note 65 (arguing that sex,
sexuality, and gender are legally and socially co-constitutive).
67. See generally BUTLER, supra note 14; Candace West & Don H. Zimmerman, Doing
Gender, 1 GENDER & Soc'Y 125 (1987).
68. See generally BUTLER, supra note 14; DENISE RILEY, AM I THAT NAME? FEMINISM
AND THE CATEGORY OF "WOMEN" IN HISTORY (1988).
69. See generally Zylan, supra note 15.
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and sex embedded in Equal Protection and Title VII doctrines.70 But if it
is a character of the self, or of the body, then sexuality still faces the dif-
ficulty that it must (unlike race and sex in most instances) be disclosed in
some way to ever become the basis of discrimination (and litigation).
In that case, sexuality becomes something much closer to conduct.72 If
so, is it expressive conduct?" Or is it private conduct, like watching dirty
8 millimeter movies in the quietude of your own home or opting for
contraception in the marriage bed?" Must it then remain private to be
free of government regulation?
Each of these is a question addressed by activists and social theo-
rists, but each is, again, largely bracketed by the Equal Protection/Title
VII institutional and discursive framework. Instead, the questions are
posed in particular ways-and particular answers begin to suggest them-
selves-because Equal Protection analysis and Title VII structure how
advocates may frame their justificatory arguments. In the debate on the
70. Let me be clear that I am referring only to these doctrinal notions of race and sex. I
believe that race and sex are no less performative than sexuality. However, their
standing as forms of legal status-that is, as characteristics of legal personhood-is,
by now, much more firmly established than that of sexual identity.
71. It should be noted that "disclosure" is a complicated social process. Coming out can
be intentional and celebratory, but it can just as easily be accidental and often trau-
matic. Moreover, one can come out without consciously doing anything at all-
indeed, even while taking great care to conceal one's gay identity. Cf Jantz v. Muci,
759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991) (denying summary judgment for defendant prin-
cipal when he allegedly refused to hire plaintiff, a married teacher, based on his
perceived 'homosexual tendencies'), rev'd, 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cit. 1992), cert.
denied, 508 U.S. 952 (1993).
72. This reasoning permits the articulation of policy positions such as those of the Catho-
lic Church (hate the sin, love the sinner) and the United States Military ("Don't Ask,
Don't Tell"). See 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2008).
73. See Rowland v. Mad River Local Sch. Dist., 559 F.2d 1221 (6th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1009, 1015-17 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting from denial of
cert.).
74. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965).
75. Jenness and Grattet make a similar argument using the language of Cress and Snow's
framing analysis:
[O]rganizers and advocates construct frames, but they do not invent them
anew. On the contrary, activists and advocates necessarily relate their goals
and programs to extant meanings; thus they are simultaneously consumers
and producers of cultural meaning. Institutionalized collective action
frames constitute the raw material(s) from which comparatively new collec-
tive action frames are built, but not always with the same neighborhood in
mind.
JENNESS & GRA-rET, supra note 15, at 105. See generally Daniel M. Cress & David A.
Snow, The Outcomes of Homeless Mobilization: The Influence of Organization, Disrup-
tion, Political Mediation, and Framing, 105 Am. J. Soc. 1063 (2000).
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HCSA, advocates and opponents contested the inclusion of the phrase
"sexual orientation" precisely because the status of LGB identity as a
status was in play. This contest can be broken down into two sub-
inquiries. First, is LGB identity the sort of social phenomenon that, like
race and gender, ought to serve as the basis of a legal definition that sorts
out invidious discrimination? That is, is discriminating on the basis of
sexual orientation analogous to discriminating on the basis of gender or
race and, therefore, "bad" in a way justifying state efforts at redress? If
so, then LGB activists were merely seeking "equal" rights under the law.
But if there was some difference between sexual orientation and
race/gender that made LGB identity something other than, or more
than, a status category, then discrimination might not always be invidi-
ous. In that case, LGB activists were seeking not equal but "special"
.76
rights.
The second sub-inquiry concerned the implications for Title VII of
codifying LGB identity as a protected status category in the HCSA. As
noted above, Title VII did not then, and does not now, include protec-
tion for LGB people at the federal level. Time and again, federal courts
have looked to the absence of such protection as an indication that
Congress affirmatively refuses to extend nondiscrimination protection to
LGB people.7 ' Thus, Title VII is important in sexuality jurisprudence
beyond its own four statutory corners; courts consistently look to the
failure of Congress to amend Title VII as evidence of its unwillingness to
include sexual orientation generally as a basis upon which to confer legal
protection. Consequently, congressional conservatives vigorously resisted
any suggestion that the inclusion of "sexual orientation" in the list of
HCSA protected categories would alter that state of affairs.
B. Contesting and Defining the Status of One's Status: The Congressional
Debate Over the Hate Crimes Statistics Act
Having examined the doctrinal policy environment within which
the HCSA was produced, it is now possible to see how and why: (a) the
phrase "sexual orientation" was replaced with "homosexuality or
76. The clearest articulation of the "special rights" argument can be found in Justice
Scalia's dissent in Romer v. Evans, a case decided a mere six years after the enactment
of the HCSA. In that case, the "special rights" discourse failed to win the day. None-
theless, the rhetoric of "special rights" retains its potency in current policy debates or,
at the very least, refuses to go away. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 638-40
(1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
77. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75 (1998); Blum v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 597 F.2d 936 (5th Cir. 1979).
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heterosexuality"; and (b) Congress added a new section to the bill ex-
pressly establishing that it not be interpreted as creating a right for LGB
people to bring nondiscrimination actions on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion. In the earliest manifestation of their opposition to the inclusion of
LGB people in the HCSA, dissenters to the House report to the Com-
mittee of the Whole House which recommended passage of the bill
claimed there was no "federal nexus" justifying inclusion of sexual orien-
tation as a protected category because "[t]here is no mention of
homosexual rights in the Constitution."" Including LGB people would,
therefore, raise their status vis-i-vis other would-be claimants, including
"women, the elderly, members of the police or passengers on urban mass
transit."7 In short, it would give them "special rights."o Congressman
William Dannemeyer put the point bluntly: the gay community, he ar-
gued, was trying (apparently with the help of the American Psychiatric
Association) to create a "rational basis on which to suggest we should
change the laws of the culture of our society so that we will accept and
equate homosexuality with heterosexuality.""1 Dannemeyer objected "in
a very firm way to an effort . . . [to] elevate sexual preference, whether
you call it heterosexuality or homosexuality, on the same basis as race,
color, religion, or natural [sic] origin."82 Congressman Gekas also wor-
ried that the inclusion of sexual orientation would "raise[] [LGB people]
to the same level of constitutionally protected classes of people."
Although Dannemeyer and Gekas invoked the language of constitu-
tional status, much of the stated opposition to the bill seemed to confuse
constitutional status with statutory status under the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Dannemeyer claimed that including sexual orientation in the
78. H.R. REP. No. 100-575 at 12 (1988) (Reps. Gekas et al. dissenting from the report).
79. Id.
80. Contra 134 CONG. REc. 11,397 (1988) (statement of Rep. Green); see also 134
CONG. REc. 11,404 (statement of Rep. Miller); 134 CONG. REc. 11,405 (statement
of Rep. Swindall).
81. 135 CONG. REc. 13,545 (1989) (statement of Rep. Dannemeyer) (emphasis added).
"Rational basis" resonates in a very specific way in antidiscrimination law. As noted
above, a key threshold question in Fourteenth Amendment equal protection cases is
which standard of review applies to the facts at issue. Most legal classifications are ex-
amined under the lowest level of scrutiny: rational basis review. Using this standard,
where the state can demonstrate that there is a legitimate state interest served by the
statute or action under review, and the means designed to achieve that interest are ra-
tionally related to it, the statute or action is constitutionally sound. Thus,
Dannemeyer's concern here (conversely stated) was the possibility that LGB advo-
cates would find support in the HCSA for future claims alleging the irrationality of
laws distinguishing between heterosexuality and homosexuality.
8 2. Id.
83. 136 CONG. REc. 6330 (1990).
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HCSA would elevate homosexuality's legal status-perhaps even to con-
stitutional standing-because it would "change the basic definition of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act to include a new status that would have the
dignity of being within the proscription of that act.",4 Congressman
Gerry Studds responded with an empirical claim that the categories in-
cluded in the bill made sense simply because "these are the principal
categories of such acts based on hate."8 For Studds, it was not members
of Congress, but perpetrators of hate crimes, who were analogizing be-
tween race, gender, and sexual orientation. Congressman Green sought
to redefine the expressive content of the legislation to emphasize its fo-
cus on hatred and violence rather than sexuality and civil status by
contending that "[i]rrespective of one's views on civil rights protections,
it is critical that Congress take a stand against hate violence."" By
changing the phrasing from "sexual orientation" (a status) to "homo-
sexuality or heterosexuality" (a form of conduct), some proponents
argued the amended bill would signify the Congress' opposition to
anti-gay crime, while saying nothing about whether or not it endorsed a
particular "lifestyle" and making plain that it did not intend to alter
Title VII in any way. Congresswoman Boxer went further in seeking to
attenuate the relationship between Title VII and the HCSA when she
reminded her colleagues that "we are all God's children."
But not all God's children enjoy protected legal status. And one
critical method by which anti-gay hate crime law advocates sought to
justify the location of sexual orientation in the catalog of protected cate-
gories in the HCSA was by invoking the discourse of sexuality as an
innate human characteristic-like race, like gender.89
Was this purely a strategic choice on the part of advocates? Proba-
bly not; the (false) opposition between "biology" and "choice" (which is
frequently mapped onto the more social scientifically pleasing categories
of "ascribed" and "achieved" statuses) resonates throughout LGB politics
and activism.90 Either way, however, posing the issue in this way-while
84. 135 CONG. REc. 13,545 (1990).
85. Id. at 13,547 (statement of Rep. Studds).
86. Id. at 13,544-45 (statement of Rep. Green).
87. See 134 CONG. REc. 11,404-07 (statements of various Representatives, debating the
perfecting amendment offered by Rep. Miller).
88. 135 CONG. Rac. 13,547 (statement of Rep. Boxer).
89. JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 61. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
686 (1973) ("[Slex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic de-
termined solely by the accident of birth."); see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 58, at 107-
10.
90. For example, in a 2007 debate between Democratic Presidential primary contenders
about gay issues, much was made of Gov. Bill Richardson's response to a question about
whether sexuality is a "choice" or "biological." See Rachel Sklar, LOGO Debate:
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perhaps strategically useful in the short term" and intuitively appealing
to many LGB people-represents a discursive cul-de-sac with respect to
anti-hate crime legislation.
This is because status-based arguments on behalf of LGB equality
are necessarily tied to a binary construction of sexuality. That is, to de-
termine one's "status" within this framework, courts and litigants must
repair to static definitions of sexual identity. One either is or is not gay or
lesbian and-by operation of the binary-if one is gay/lesbian, then one
is not heterosexual.93 This seems an unremarkable, unobjectionable, and
frankly functional approach to take in one's daily encounters with sexual
identity. As we shall see, however, within the context of anti-gay hate
crime legislation, it raises intractable jurisprudential problems associated
with such laws' embedded notions of causation and mens rea.
IV. PASSION, DESIRE, AND THE PROBLEMATICS OF IDENTITY:
JUSTIFYING AND DEFINING ANTI-GAY HATE CRIME LAWS
As important as the Congressional debate over enacting hate crime
tracking laws was, it permitted only a first order set of justificatory ar-
guments. That is, the debate over including sexual orientation in the
HCSA was directed at the basic question of whether the state ought to
recognize (and try to measure) the existence of anti-gay hate crime. This
was an important (and probably necessary) first step for the anti-gay
Richardson's Macaca Moment, or ... Not?, HUFFINGTON PosT, Aug. 12, 2007,
http://www. huffingtonpost.com/2007/08/12/logo-debate-richardsons n_ 60081.html.
Richardson said he believed it was a "choice"-an answer that did not satisfy his
questioner and which led to a lot of bad press the next day. See id. One progressive
blogger anointed it Richardson's "Macaca moment". Id. Faced with the alternatives
of "choice" and "biolog[y]," Richardson plainly chose poorly, given his audience and
his manifest agenda to win over some of their votes. See id. However, I would
contend that Richardson was not wrong; the question was wrong. As I argue
elsewhere, sexuality, properly understood, is neither "biological" nor a "choice"; it is,
rather, a socially constructed experience of physical, cognitive, and emotional desire.
Zylan, supra note 5, ch. 3.
91. LGB advocates eventually won this battle, and the language was changed from "het-
erosexuality or homosexuality" to "sexual orientation" in 1990. Compare H.R. 1048,
101st Cong. § 2(a) (as introduced, Feb. 22, 1989), with Hate Crime Statistics Act,
sec. 1, § 534(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 101-275, 104 Stat. 140 (1990) (enacting H.R 1048,
101st Cong. (1990) as amended).
92. It is equally unpromising when applied to same-sex sexual harassment law. See Zylan,
supra note 15, passim.
93. Indeed, the contested nature of bisexuality is, itself, a product of the limitations em-
bedded in this binary construction of sexuality. See generally Jay P. Paul, The Bisexual
Identity: An Idea Without Social Recognition, 9 J. HomosExuATY 45 (1984).
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hate crime movement, but it failed to touch upon the deeper, more spe-
cific, and much more difficult issues raised by the codification of anti-
gay hate crime sentence enhancement laws. What is anti-gay hate crime,
exactly? What legal mechanisms are implicated in an effort to define and
establish the terms of proof for this new category of crime? How does
one justify treating this particular kind of crime differently-indeed,
more harshly-than other kinds of crime? Anti-gay hate crimes seem
worse, but why? And are they? More to the point, can anti-gay hate
crime law advocates make the case that they are, without rendering in-
coherent the premises upon which the project for LGB equality is based?
Answers to these questions present and suggest themselves in a now
expansive literature seeking to justify and define the operation of hate
crime legislation." As noted earlier, for reasons both moral and political,
criminal punishments must be justified in some way; if we are going to
deprive someone of his or her liberty (and, in the case of capital crimes,
his or her life), we have to demonstrate a compelling reason to do so."
Justifications for criminal sanctions tend to fall into three broad catego-
ries: retributivist accounts (which assert that punishment is just to the
extent that it is deserved by the offender as a result of his or her culpable
conduct), utilitarian accounts (which assert that punishment is just if
the benefits it provides to a society outweigh the costs incurred by im-
posing it-often described in terms of whether there is a sufficient
"deterrent" effect), and expressivist accounts (which assert that pun-
ishment is just if it serves an important symbolic purpose in expressing
society's condemnation of the conduct at issue).
Advocates of anti-gay hate crime laws resort to each of these kinds
of arguments, though retributivist and expressivist arguments are most
prominent. For example, the Human Rights Campaign contends that
hate crimes should be punished specially because they are more harmful
than other crimes:
All violent crimes are reprehensible. But the damage done by
hate crimes cannot be measured solely in terms of physical in-
jury or dollars and cents. Hate crimes rend the fabric of our
society and fragment communities because they target a whole
group and not just the individual victim. Hate crimes are
committed to cause fear to a whole community. A violent hate
94. See the review in Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Preou-
dice, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1081 (2004).
95. See FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 33, chs. 2.1-2.4.
96. This includes both general deterrence (aggregate deterrence of crime in the popula-
tion) and specific deterrence ("incapacitation" of the offender).
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crime is intended to "send a message" that an individual and
"their kind" will not be tolerated, many times leaving the vic-
tim and others in their group feeling isolated, vulnerable and
unprotected. 97
The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force echoes this theme of terroris-
tic harm generated by anti-gay hate crime, and adds the expressivist
claim that hate crime laws "send a message that certain crimes that strike
at this country's core values, such as the freedom to live free of persecu-
tion, will be punished and deterred by both enhanced penalties and
federal involvement in the investigation and prosecution of the crime.""
Whether they rely upon utilitarian, expressivist, or retributivist ra-
tionales, however, the justificatory claims offered in support of anti-hate
crime laws produce troubling discursive consequences for advocates of
LGB equality." The intersection of hate crime discourse and LGB iden-
tity discourse produces a sexual truth regimeoo that defines hatred as a
categorical emotion-that is, as a particular bodily experience that is
produced at the boundary marking off fixed sexual categories. This fic-
tive construction of animus in turn defines a fictive construction of
desire (as its antithesis). As a result, desire is positioned as the discipli-
nary outcome of a legal mechanism of prohibition. Simply put, in the
truth regime produced by hate crime jurisprudence, we understand sex-
ual desire primarily by what it may not be: the transgression of sexual
status categories.
Whether they sound in utilitarianism, retributivism, expressivism
or some combination of the three, justificatory claims concerning hate
crime laws are primarily normative claims; that is, they establish argu-
ments explaining why hate crime laws ought (or ought not) to exist as
distinct instruments of punishment. However, in making such norma-
tive arguments, advocates and opponents of hate crime legislation also
deploy and instantiate certain empirical and ontological claims about
97. Human Rights Campaign, Hate Crimes, http://www.hrc.org/issues/hate-crimes.asp
(last visited Feb. 5, 2008) [hereinafter HRC Hate Crimes].
98. Nat'1 Gay & Lesbian Task Force, The Issues: Hate Crimes, http://
www.thetaskforce.org/issues/hate-crimes-main-page (last visited Jan. 25, 2009)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter NGLTF Hate Crimes].
99. Because much of the normative heavy lifting on behalf of hate crime legislation is not
specifically addressed to anti-gay hate crime laws, in the following discussion I will re-
fine the logic of existing claims about hate crime laws generally so that they are
tailored to anti-gay hate crime sentence enhancements specifically.
100. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, VOL. I. (Robert Hur-
ley trans., 1986); MICHEL FOUCAULT & COLIN GORDON, POWERIKNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRITINGS, 1972-77 (1980).
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the nature of sexuality, animus, desire, identity, and the nature of the
criminal law (among other things). I take no position on which of the
justificatory claims I discuss below is or is not persuasive in a normative
sense. Instead, I examine these claims in order to unpack the empirical
and ontological assertions that serve to ground hate crime legislation's
justificatory discourses. It is in this space, I contend, that law produces
an account of sexuality that is both institutionally specific and
polysemic.10' Extant cultural and political discourses of desire, animus,
fear, and identity are read into law as a kind of lay behavioral science,
and as they circulate through the institutional processes of legalism they
are reduced to a set of predictive and reconstructive maxims about sex-
ual status and identity. 102 The complexity of desire and animus is thus
sacrificed in favor of a set of evidentiary practices that make sense within
law as a specific institutional location, but which, when exceeding the
bounds of this location, inscribe an unduly limiting conception of sexu-
ality upon the social body.os
A. Utilitarian Justifications
Utilitarian theories of punishment are consequential in nature.
That is, they conceive of punishment as just so long as the consequences
that it produces are, on balance, favorable for society as a whole. In
short, utilitarians conceive of punishment as a social evil that must be
outweighed by a social good (however defined).' Thus, a pure utilitar-
ian approach to the criminal law would be indifferent to the intrinsic
quality of punishment-that is, to whether or not it is deserved by the
individual defendant as a result of his or her culpable conduct. As phi-
losopher Michael Moore has suggested, this raises the specter of a
discomfiting hypothetical: what if a host of social ills could be avoided
through the punishment of a single innocent person?1o' One adopting a
pure utilitarian approach should find such punishment just. Moore
101. On the institutional dimensions and polysemic quality of legal discourse, see Zylan,
supra note 5, ch. 2.
102. Id.
103. Zylan, supra note 5, chs. 2-3.
104. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEG-
ISLATION 158-59 (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1996) (1789).
105. Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER
AND THE EMoTIONS 179, 212-17 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., digital ed. 1999) [here-
inafter Moore in RESPONSIBILITY]; Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of
Retribution, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAw, supra note 33, at 86, 86-97 [here-
inafter Moore in FOUNDATIONS].
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contends that our intuitive sense that this would be morally wrong sig-
nals our fundamental (perhaps universal) allegiance to retributivism.06
Whether or not this is true, however, a pure utilitarian approach is
plainly incompatible with the institutional and political reality of the
American criminal justice system. As a result, many contemporary utili-
tarian theories are best characterized as "mixed" theories, in which
utilitarianism is tempered with retributivism as a limiting condition.10 A
punishment is just, on this view, if and only if: (a) the good it produces
outweighs the evil that is produced by inflicting it; and (b) the target of
punishment is deserving of at least some punishment. The addition of
the limiting condition may (or may not) serve to rule out the most ob-
jectionable hypothetical punishments, but it does little to solve
utilitarianism's seemingly intractable measurement and definitional
problems. For example, how does one define and measure a social
"good"? In Bentham's theory, utility is defined as "benefit, advantage,
pleasure, good, or happiness"108 and social utility is simply the aggregate
of every person's individual utility-in Bentham's words, "the total hap-
piness of the community.',,o But what if some (or many) criminals
derive a very high degree of satisfaction from committing crime, while
their victims experience a comparatively lower level of "disutility" from
being their targets? Should the criminal law be predicated on the notion
that, on balance, this is a satisfactory state of affairs? This question sug-
gests a key weakness of utilitarian justifications of criminal punishment:
they are agnostic about what counts as a good to an individual (and,
consequently, to society as a whole).o10 Like Moore's hypothetical pun-
ishment of an innocent to benefit the many, this implication of
utilitarianism does not sit well with our intuitive sense of justice.1
On the other hand, utilitarian criminal law theorists' focus on the
deterrence of future crime does enjoy great intuitive appeal."2 But deter-
106. See Moore in RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 105.
107. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSO-
PHY OF LAW (Oxford Univ. Press 1968).
108. BENTHAM, supra note 104, at 12.
109. Id. at 158.
110. Dan M. Kahan & Martha G. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal
Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 354, 354-55 (1996).
111. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (Harvard Univ. Press 2005) (1971).
112. HART, supra note 107, at 8 ("Even those who look upon human law as a mere in-
strument for enforcing 'morality as such' . . . would not deny that the aim of criminal
legislation is to set up types of behaviour .. . as legal standards of behaviour and to
secure conformity with them."). LGB organizations have not elaborated much of a
deterrence justification, but they do sometimes adopt the language of deterrence. See
NGLTF Hate Crimes, supra note 98 ("[Anti-gay hate crime] laws send a message that
certain crimes strike at this country's core values ... and will be punished and de-
26 [Vol. 16:1
PASSIONS WE LIKE . . . AND THOSE WE DON'T
rence is a complicated phenomenon in its own right and perhaps espe-
cially so when considered in the context of hate crime legislation. As a
general matter, utilitarian theories rely on a kind of market model of
deterrence predicated on the logic of rational decision-making."' All
other things being equal, such theories contend, the marginal utility
gained by committing a crime will diminish in direct proportion to the
severity of the criminal sanction one might expect to receive if caught
committing it, multiplied by the risk of being caught and prosecuted."'
The econometric dimensions of this account are fairly plain; what is im-
portant to notice here is the cognitive rationality displayed by the
erstwhile criminal. Deterrence requires several cognitive transactions.
First, the would-be criminal must make an educated guess about the
likely costs and benefits of a given criminal act. Next, s/he must make a
rational calculation along the lines of: (benefits of crime) - (costs of crime
* risk of imposition of costs). Finally, s/he must choose and carry out the
course of action that rationally implements the result of this calculation.
While it is possible that this series of rational cognitive steps might un-
fold as hypothesized, and might even do so more quickly than this
description suggests (based on the embedded knowledge that each of us
carries around with us about crime and the criminal law), this account,
when offered as a justification for sentence enhancements, fundamen-
tally conflicts with the discursively constructed archetypical hate crime.
As articulated by advocates of anti-gay hate crime legislation, hate
crimes are-above all else-explosive manifestations of a particular
emotion: hatred."' While different jurisdictions have taken different
positions on how much of the motivation behind a hate crime must be
accounted for by hatred,"' one can say that-at a minimum-an anti-
gay hate crime ought to be characterized to some degree by animus to-
ward gay people and/or homosexuality." 7 Because the underlying crimes
terred by both enhanced penalties and federal involvement in the investigation and
prosecution of the crime.").
113. See generally JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974); JACK P.
GIBBS, CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1975); FRANKUN E. ZIMRING &
GORDON HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL (1973).
114. See, e.g, Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1201-02 (1985).
115. See, e.g., Press Release, Nat'1 Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, Hate-Crime Assailant Pleads
Guilty to Aggravated Battery Charges (Apr. 1, 2003) (on file with author) (describing
beating of three men leaving a gay pride event as "a blatant display of hatred and vio-
lence").
116. See JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 117-18.
117. This, too, is not necessarily an uncontroversial claim. Indeed, several scholars seem to
embrace the notion that the existence of hatred may not be a necessary element of an
anti-gay hate crime. See, e.g., JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 110; Jordan B.
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committed by the perpetrators of hate crime (assault, battery, rape,
murder, etc.) are already punishable by the criminal law,118 the sentence
enhancement that attaches to hate crimes must, according to a utilitar-
ian justification, represent an additional punishment that increases the
"cost""119 of committing such crimes and therefore serves as a deterrent.120
To be persuasive, the utilitarian justification must make a convincing
case that hatred is subject to deterrence and that sentence enhancements
are an effective mechanism for achieving such deterrence.
One need not adopt an overly mechanistic conception of emotion
to find the hypothesized deterrent effect of anti-gay hate crime laws
problematic. Certainly, it is not self-evident that emotions-unlike ac-
tion-relative mental states-are susceptible to deterrence. Action-relative
mental states (the traditional mens rea categories of intentionality,
knowledge, recklessness, and negligence) arise directly out of the rela-
tionship between thought and action. Within the criminal law,
culpability increases in direct proportion to the level of cognitive delib-
eration (the mens rea) that attends a given prohibited act (the actus
reus). This framework makes sense within a utilitarian conception of
deterrence; the culpability scale simply reflects levels of resistance to so-
Woods, Taking The "Hate" Out Of Hate Crimes: Applying Unfair Advantage Theory
To Justify The Enhanced Punishment Of Opportunistic Bias Crimes, 56 U.C.L.A. L.
REv. 489 (2008). From a social problems perspective on the construction of hate
crime as a social phenomenon, this is a consistent position to take. However, it makes
no sense to eliminate hate as an element from an account of hate crime legislation
that focuses on its discursive dimensions.
118. See LAWRENCE, supra note 31, ch. 3; Hurd & Moore, supra note 3, at 1086.
119. Advocates also offer a version of this justification that focuses on the increased risk of
being caught that may attend the enactment of laws expressly sanctioning anti-gay
hate crime. They contend that passage of such laws increases society's overall aware-
ness of the existence of anti-gay hate crime as well as the state's disapproval of it. As a
result, law enforcement may be more likely to ferret out and prosecute anti-gay hate
crimes, thus increasing the risk that one who commits such a crime would be caught
(and increasing the relative "cost" of committing the crime). This justification does
rely on a utilitarian logic, but it seems to me that it partakes more fundamentally of
expressivism in that it makes sense only if the denunciation effect of law is taken into
account. See infra Part IV.B., particularly text accompanying notes 140-148.
120. An analogous case might help demonstrate why this is so. Consider arguments and
evidence concerning the deterrent effect of the death penalty on, for example, murder
rates. The central question utilitarians must ask in such debates is not whether capital
punishment reduces murder in a given jurisdiction. Rather, it is whether capital pun-
ishment reduces murder in the jurisdiction more effectively than other, lesser sanctions,
do. Remember, for utilitarians, punishment itself is a social evil. Thus, imposing a
greater punishment than is needed to deter the commission of crime would, on bal-
ance, produce a less than optimal level of social welfare. See THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA: CURRENT CONTROVERSIEs 127-34 (Hugo A. Bedau ed., 1997).
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cial and criminal prohibitions. 12 A person who intentionally commits a
crime fully understanding the consequences of his or her wrongful act
will need a greater threat of punishment in the future to dissuade him or
her from doing so again than will someone who merely negligently
commits a crime (and who, it can be assumed, did not think as long
about its consequences and, therefore, may not have given them ade-
quate weight). Indeed, negligence is a contested basis for criminal
liability precisely because a negligent actor is being held responsible for
what s/he should have known (and acted upon), but did not.122 Kowl-
edge and foresight form the backdrop within which the economic model
of deterrence operates; deterrence presupposes a distance between
thought and action within which one might interpose informed free
will.
Emotions such as hatred, however, fit poorly (if at all) within the
deterrence model. Even if, as legal scholar Martha Nussbaum con-
tends, 123 emotions are hardly devoid of cognition, they nonetheless
appear rather resistant to the interposition of free will. In Nussbaum's
account, while emotions are not to be conceived as drives, reflexive ac-
tions, or "animal" instincts, the cognitive dimension of emotion is
nonetheless distinguishable from the kind of thought that attends ac-
tion-relative mental states. For Nussbaum, emotions and the thoughts
that attend and inform them are essentially simultaneous. 24 An emotion
requires an "assent" to a "judgment," and therefore embraces an "inten-
tional" element. But this is a notion of intent quite different from the
one that characterizes motivation:
Emotions, in short, are acknowledgements of our goals and of
their status. It then remains to be seen what the world will let us
do about them. Desires may all contain a perception of their object
as a good; but not all perceptions of good give rise directly to ac-
tion-guiding desires. This suggests that the tendency to explain
actions in terms of two distinct sorts of items, beliefs or
121. It also coheres with retributivism. A person who thinks through the consequences of
his or her wrongful actions and nonetheless proceeds with them is more deserving of
punishment precisely because he or she had opportunities to choose the right path of
action and decided each time to forego them.
122. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology ofNegligence, 76 B.U. L. REv. 249 (1996).
123. See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY: DISGUST, SHAME,
AND THE LAW 24-42 (2004) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY];
MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS
64-65 (1st ed. 2001) [hereinafter NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT]; see also
KAHAN & NUSSBAUM, supra note 110.
124. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 123, ch. 1.
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judgments and desires, needs to be made more complicated.
Emotions are judgments, but not inert judgments; on account
of their evaluative content, they have an intimate connection
with motivation that other beliefs do not; on the other hand,
because they may not hook into the situation at hand in a way
productive of a concrete plan of action, they are different from de-
sires as well.'25
Emotions are thus not "action-guiding desires," and they stand apart
from "motivation." Indeed, a crucial part of Nussbaum's neo-Stoic ac-
count of emotion is her assertion that "most of the time emotions link
us to items that we regard as important for our well being, but do not
fully control" and therefore indicate "a certain passivity before the
world."l26 This is plainly distinguishable from action-relative mental
states, which are very much about acting upon the world. Because deter-
rence must operate within the space between emotion and action-
where "action-guiding desires" are formed-the utilitarian justification
for anti-gay hate crime laws fails on its own terms. To prevent such
crimes, it is not hatred that must be deterred (as if it could be);127 rather,
deterrence must operate via the conventional mens rea categories (the
decision boxes of intentional action) to change the "action-guiding de-
sire" calculation. In the end, Nussbaum's evaluative conception
of emotion fails to rescue a deterrence theory of anti-gay hate crime
laws. 128
125. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added).
126. Id. at 43.
127. Given Nussbaum's assertion that evaluative thoughts/beliefs and feelings emerge
simultaneously in emotion, this seems doubtful at best.
128. Nonetheless, Nussbaum expressly endorses hate crime legislation. NUSSBAUM, HID-
ING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 123, at 293-96. Dan Kahan-Nussbaum's
coauthor and equally forceful proponent of an evaluative conception of emotion-
argues that courts' treatment of the homosexual panic defense in anti-gay hate crime
cases is traceable to society's ambivalence about whether homosexuality or homopho-
bia is more disgusting. Kahan contends that, because both pro- and anti-gay
sentiments are grounded in social norms and hierarchies, the legal status of gay panic
defenses and sentence enhancements reflects (in a fairly straightforward manner) so-
cial judgments about whether homophobes or homosexuals are worthy of social
respect (or conversely, whether homosexuals or homophobes are "disgusting"). Dan
M. Kahan, An Anatomy ofDisgust in Criminal Law, 96 MicH. L. REv. 1621, 1637-
38 (1998). At least two problems arise in Kahan's account. First, in his discussion of
anti-gay hate crime and the homosexual panic defense, Kahan seems to reduce disgust
to the desire to shore up social status. See id. at 1635. This ignores the complex emo-
tional mixture that constitutes sexually grounded animus. Not all social minorities are
treated with disgust per se. The disgust which operates in anti-gay hate crime is spe-
cific in its formulation, and its connection to sexuality is hardly incidental. See infra
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More importantly, the deterrence justification for hate crime laws is
squarely at odds with the politically-constructed "normal" hate crime
narrative. 129 The archetypical anti-gay hate crime is one characterized by
irrationality-the irrationality of homophobia, bias, and prejudice. 130
note 133 and accompanying text. Indeed, Nussbaum treats homophobia with far
greater nuance. See NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 123, at 77-84,
256-64. Kahan further claims, "Clearly offenders who kill (or assault) on the basis of
'homosexual panic' are disgusted by their victims." Kahan, supra, at 1635. Yet this is
far from "clear"; even Herek's research, which Kahan relies upon extensively, empha-
sizes the inextricable connection between desire and disgust that informs
homophobia (and, presumably, acts of violence committed as expressions of homo-
phobia). See Gregory M. Herek, Psychological Heterosexism andAnti-Gay Violence: The
Social Psychology of Bigotry and Bashing, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE,
supra note 15, at 149, 150-58. Seeking to establish a cognitive basis for anti-gay ani-
mus, Kahan's account reduces the emotion of anti-gay "hatred" to a kind of strategic
enactment or reinforcement of social norms. If this were all that were happening in
an anti-gay hate crime (or, more importantly, all that advocates of anti-gay hate crime
laws contend is happening in an anti-gay hate crime), it is hard to understand why the
criminalization of anti-gay "hatred" would be their objective. Indeed, advocates' dis-
cursive construction of the narrative of "overkill" in anti-gay hate crime emphasizes
their conception of anti-gay hate crime as profoundly beyond reason and excessive to
the task of reinforcing heteronormativity. See, e.g., Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against
Defamation, Covering Hate Crimes (Oct. 1, 2003), http://www.glaad.org/media/
resource-kit -detail.php?id=3
4 95.
129. See JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 122. It is worth pointing out here a latent
tension within scholarly treatments of anti-gay hate crime law discourse, and within
the discourse itself. The language of hate crime statutes closely tracks the language of
antidiscrimination law, emphasizing intentionality and selection of a victim rather
than the emotional component of hate motivation. Id. at 121-22. However, as Jen-
ness and Grattet describe, the political will behind hate crime legislation is predicated
on the deployment of a discourse that emphasizes the emotional and visceral dimen-
sions of imagined and real hate crime incidents. Id. at 2-6. The intentional selection
discourse sounds much more rational when compared with the discourse of hatred
and fury, but it, too, relies on a fundamental irrationality-that which informs the
selection of the victim. And, in any case, the discursive field of the anti-gay hate
crime law movement is, as Jenness and Gratnet admit, plainly dominated by the ha-
tred and fury version of the anti-gay hate crime narrative. Id. at 17-41. Finally, as
described infra text accompanying note 170, repairing to antidiscrimination narra-
tives of causation (as the "victim selection" argument does) leads only to deeper
discursive conflicts for LGB advocates.
130. NAT'L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LESBIAN, GAY, BIsExUAL AND
TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 2007, at 17 (2007) ("[An] anti-LGBT violence is revela-
tory of social pathologies more fundamental, and ultimately more dangerous, that
other violent crime."); Barry D. Adam, Theorizing Homophobia, 1 SEXUALITIEs 387,
387-404 (1998); Richard A. Berk, Elizabeth A. Boyd & Karl M. Hammer, Thinking
More Clearly About Hate-Motivated Crimes, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING Vio-
LENCE, supra note 15, at 123, 131-34; Joseph Harry, Conceptualizing Anti-Gay
Violence, in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 113, 113-21.
The National Center for Lesbian Rights offers a similar account of anti-gay hate
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Within the juridical and discursive field constituting the terrain upon
which anti-gay hate crime legislation is debated, it is precisely this
irrationality that renders a hate crime more socially pernicious than con-
ventional crime and makes the passage of anti-gay hate crime legislation
a politically progressive act. 13 Advocates correctly point out that crimes
committed against gay people have historically been under-reported,
under-prosecuted, and under-punished because of the unreasonable and
objectively baseless disapprobation of gay people and homosexuality
(which rendered anti-gay crimes not crimes at all).' 32 And crimes com-
mitted against gay people because they are gay are senseless in almost too
many ways to count. For starters, homophobia seems to betray a simul-
taneous disgust of gay sexuality (which hate crime perpetrators seek to
violently destroy) and a fear that homosex13 is almost irresistibly
crime as pathology. Describing attacks on transgendered woman Gwen Araujo and
lesbian Sakia Gunn, the NCLR's Executive Director Kate Kendell wrote,
These crimes are separated by seven months and 3,000 miles but they share
the deep-seated misogyny and homophobia of every hate crime directed at
a lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgendered person. These two women tell the
same story from a different lens: transgressions of gender, whether based on
who one loves or how one identifies, will be brutally repressed and savagely
responded to.
Press Release, Nat'l Ctr. for Lesbian Rights, The Story of Two Newarks: Kate
Kendell's Op-Ed on the Tragic Deaths of Gwen Araujo and Sakia Gunn (June 5,
2003) (on file with author).
131. If we, as a society, continued to believe that hatred of gay people was reasonable, it is
hard to see how there would be any support for legislation singling out and targeting
anti-gay hatred for specific criminal punishment.
132. See McVeigh, supra note 22, at 843-67; Am. Civil Liberties Union, Letter to the
House Urging Support for the Local Law Enforcement Hate Crimes Prevention Act,
May 2, 2007, http://www.aclu.org/gbt/crimjustice/29600leg20070502.html (quot-
ing the report of one victim who wrote that her gang-rape was ignored by her local
police department: "They closed their book, and said, 'Well, you were asking for
it.'"). The ACLU has also seized upon the failure of state and local police depart-
ments to adequately prosecute crimes against gay people to assert a jurisdictional basis
for federal legislation prohibiting anti-gay hate crimes sounding in Equal Protection
doctrine:
Federal legislation addressing such criminal civil rights violations is neces-
sary because state and local law enforcement officers are sometimes
unwilling or unable to prosecute those crimes because of either inadequate
resources or their own bias against the victim. The prospect of such failure
to provide equal protection of the laws justifies federal jurisdiction.
Id.
133. The term "homosex" may be a bit perplexing. It is intended to elide the distinction
between a status-a "being"-and a practice-a "doing"--of same-sex sexuality. Zy-
Ian, supra note 5, ch. 1.
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seductive."' Likewise, gay men (within the normal hate crime narrative,
the prototypical victims of anti-gay hate crime)' are simultaneously
demonized as effeminate and weak, yet also deeply threatening.1
These discourses serve to construct the homophobic social and cul-
tural fabric out of which, activists and scholars contend, hate crimes
emerge as the almost inevitable consequence."' Yet if homophobia is this
objectively irrational (and I agree that it must be, when conceived as a
distinct combination of fear and hatred), it is also manifestly ill-suited to
134. Drawing upon Georges Bataille and Sigmund Freud, Leo Bersani has written pro-
vocatively and convincingly about the nature and source of this simultaneous
loathing and desire. See Leo Bersani, Is the Rectum a Grave?, 43 OCTOBER 197, 209-
12 (1987); cf NUSSBAUM, HIDING FROM HUMANITY, supra note 123, at 113-14
(describing homophobia as a form of disgust predicated on the notion that "you can
be penetrated").
135. The (widely recognized and admitted) limitations of data collection render generali-
zations about the gender composition of the population of anti-gay hate crime
victims perilous at best. But the latest figures offered by the Anti-Violence Project do
not offer empirical support for the normal hate crime narrative's almost exclusive fo-
cus on male victims. NAT'L COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, ANTI-LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL & TRANSGENDER VIOLENCE IN 2007, at 9 (2007). According to the
Anti-Violence Project, in 2006, 57% of anti-gay hate crime victims identified as
male, while 41% identified as female. Interpreting these numbers invites extensive
speculation, especially since 13% identified as transgendered, meaning that some vic-
tims identified themselves as male or female and as transgendered. Id. But if one
assumes that women and men are about equally represented in the population of gay
people (as they are in the general population-an assumption that almost certainly
overstates the number of self-identified lesbians), the gender imbalance is minimal at
best.
136. The discursive construction of gay men as effeminate and weak is powerful and of
long standing. See, e.g., MICHAEL MESSNER, TAKING THE FIELD: WOMEN, MEN, AND
SPORTS 35-38 (2002). At the same time, a subordinated discourse-perhaps most sa-
lient in the debate over whether gay people should be permitted to serve openly in
the U.S. military-conceives of gay men as sexually threatening (especially in com-
munal showers). See GARY L. LEHRING, OFFICIALLY GAY: THE POLITICAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY BY THE U.S. MILITARY 90 (2003).
137. Gregory M. Herek, The Social Context ofHate Crimes: Notes on Cultural Heterosexism,
in HATE CRIMES: CONFRONTING VIOLENCE, supra note 15, at 89; see also NAT'L
COAL. OF ANTI-VIOLENCE PROGRAMS, supra note 135, at 19 ("[G]iven the commu-
nity's experience over the last few years, any optimism must be exhibited cautiously
when looking at concerns of violence and safety. The dynamics that helped contrib-
ute to the astounding jump in reports of violence in the preceding years can and may
again occur."); Press Release, GLAAD, GLAAD and National Coalition of Anti-
Violence Programs Express Sorrow and Horror at Attack on Gay Man in Wyoming
(Oct. 9, 1998), http://web.archive.org/web/20050805081734/http://www.glaad.org/
medialarchive-detail.php?id= 130 (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) ("'Hateful rhetoric fos-
ters a fearful and intolerant environment-all the ingredients necessary for putting
people in harms [sic] way.. . . That there are people who hate [Matthew Shepard] for
being open and honest about his life is unconscionable."').
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respond to legal mechanisms of deterrence relying upon rational cost-
benefit analyses.
Still, even if anti-gay hate crime sentence enhancements cannot de-
ter anti-gay hatred in a utilitarian sense, they might serve-in some
other way not relying upon the cognitive reasoning of the would-be hate
criminal-to reduce the likelihood that anti-gay hatred would arise in
the first instance. As Nussbaum points out (correctly, I think), the
evaluative content of emotions is profoundly socially constructed. If I
feel grief over the death of my mother, the content of that grief-and its
appropriateness"-is deeply constituted by the social construct
"mother" (or "mother love")."' Emotions are "localized" and "eudai-
monistic," but their content plainly varies with social norms-a fact,
Nussbaum notes, that is reflected in the criminal law's treatment of "pas-
sion.""' If so, changes in the content of an emotion must come from
deep and extensive changes in social norms. Sentence enhancements
might contribute in some small measure to such a normative shift and,
if that is true, such an effect might provide sufficient justification for the
imposition of additional criminal penalties. Such an argument takes us
away from utilitarianism, however, and into the realm of expressivist
justifications.
B. ExpressivistJustifications
Expressivist justifications make a seemingly commonsensical claim
about law: whatever else it might do, law serves an expressive function in
communicating what a society values and what it disdains.' Rooted in
Durkheimian functionalism, expressivism highlights the symbolic im-
port of laws (and of their enforcement) in changing, publicizing, and/or
solidifying social norms."' The criminal law is particularly important in
this respect because, expressivists contend, it has a particularly powerful
138. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT, supra note 123, at 46, 157.
139. Id. at 163.
140. See Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591
(1996) (discussing expressivism generally); see also Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Hate
Crimes: Symbolic Politics, Expressive Law, or Tool for Criminal Enforcement?, 80 B.U.
L. REV. 1227, 1254-61 (2000) (discussing expressivism as applied to hate crime legis-
lation); Hurd & Moore, supra note 3, at 1100-17 (evaluating expressivist rationales
for hate crime laws).
141. See generally EMILE DURKHEIM & W.D. HALLS, THE DivisIoN OF LABOR IN SOCIETY
(1984); J.M. Balkin, The Constitution of Status, 106 YALE L.J. 2313 (1997); Richard
H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV.
338, 338 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.
REV. 2021 (1996).
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denunciatory effect. Not only do criminal laws typically carry harsher
sanctions than civil laws do, but the stigma associated with criminality
lends added symbolic value to the enforcement of laws falling within the
criminal, rather than the civil, code."'2 Thus, apart from whether or not
a given law "fits" a crime (in a retributivist sense) or whether it is likely
to deter future crimes (in a utilitarian sense), expressivists contend that
laws may be justified if they communicate a socially valuable message.
For expressivists, the commission of a crime sends a message of disre-
spect for social norms and values, and punishment must, therefore,
respond with an equally forceful message denouncing the criminal's
conduct and, therefore, reaffirming the norms and values shown disre-
spect by virtue of the criminal's actions.'43
As applied to hate crime laws, expressivism typically amounts to
one or both of the following claims. First, expressivists contend that hate
crimes send particularly pernicious messages to victims and their com-
munities and consequently require particularly strong messages of
denunciation in response.' Second, expressivists claim that hate crime
legislation is important not only for what it says about hate crime (that
it is particularly disfavored compared with other sorts of crime), but also
for what it affirmatively says about the targets of hate crimes (that they
are valued members of the civic community) or about equality more
generally (that it is an important social objective).' At a slightly higher
level of abstraction, Heidi Hurd and Michael Moore note that expressiv-
ist claims about hate crime laws may be divided into those that are
tethered to conventional theories of punishment and those that make
the claim that the expressive function of hate crime laws suffices, per se,
to justify their enactment and enforcement. 6 Expressivist claims teth-
ered to conventional theories add the expressivist justification to either
retributivist or utilitarian justifications, while per se expressivist justifica-
tions claim that "punishment is justified if and only if it sends an
appropriate message of denunciation to a defendant and those who
share the defendant's corrosive views."' 47 On this view, "legally conveyed
denunciation [is] such a good thing that it and it alone can justify pun-
ishment."18
142. Beale, supra note 140, at 1266-67.
143. Kahan, supra note 128, at 1641; Kahan, supra note 140, at 599. See also Hurd &
Moore, supra note 3, at 1100-01.
144. Kahan, supra note 128, at 599; see also Beale, supra note 140, at 1265-66.
145. Hurd & Moore, supra note 3, at 1100-17 (describing expressivists justifications of
hate/bias crime legislation).




MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Whether one relies upon a mixed or a pure version of the expressiv-
ist justification for hate crime laws, however, one is directed to the same
essential query: if hate crime sentence enhancements are important be-
cause they express important social values, what, precisely, are those
values and how are they specifically conveyed by sentence enhance-
ments? Hurd and Moore point out that most expressivist accounts of
hate crime sentence enhancements seem to assume that the denuncia-
tory effect of such laws begins and ends with passage of the legislation."'
Yet plainly this cannot be the case. Actual defendants are charged with,
and tried for, offenses characterized as "hate crimes." Actual crime vic-
tims give voice to their experiences of suffering as a result of crimes that
may or may not be characterized as hate-motivated. How that affects the
experience of victimhood remains an open empirical question, but that
naming-or failing to name-a criminal act a "hate crime" matters in
some way seems incontestable.
To my mind, expressivists are absolutely correct that law conveys
meaning-to offenders, to victims, and to bystander publics. But ex-
pressivist accounts of anti-gay hate crime laws have thus far vastly
understated the complexity of meaning that attends anti-gay hate crime
discourse. Anti-gay hate crime sentence enhancements do not, and can-
not, simply assert that "hate crimes are bad," or that "LGB people are
valuable members of the community"; to suggest this is to ignore the
institutional specificity of law. Even the broadest statements about hate
crimes and sentence enhancements conveyed in legislative debates evince
greater nuance than these simple statements, interacting as they do with
specific jurisprudential frameworks that confine and delimit the terms
within which such laws are drafted, considered, and acted upon. In
practice, these discourses are refined even more-by advocates seeking
to prod law enforcement into defining and prosecuting specific inci-
dents as hate crimes, by prosecutors seeking to fulfill their professional
mandates of doing justice and protecting the public, by defense attor-
neys seeking to fulfill their professional mandates of representing their
clients and forcing the state to prove their cases, and by judges seeking
to make sense of the formal and practical dictates of the criminal code.
There can be little doubt that this is highly expressive work of a deadly
serious kind. Yet what is most prominently expressed in the polysemic
149. Id. at 1114-15 ("[T]he question remains as to why so many proponents of hate/bias
crime legislation regard the need to 'send a message' to be a sufficient justification for
such laws. We think it is because such proponents are focusing only on the passage of
the bills enacting hate/bias crime legislation.... Forgotten is the obvious fact that
when one uses the criminal law as a medium for sending a message, one then has to
punish those who do not get the message.").
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construction of anti-gay hate crime, and anti-gay hate crime law, is a set
of discourses that sound deeply and specifically in retributivism.
C Retributivist Justifications
Retributivists contend that punishment should always follow cul-
pability. As Michael Moore puts it, "[a] retributivist punishes because,
and only because, the offender deserves it.'"o Desert, however, can be
defined in terms of the amount of harm that is wrought by the conduct
at issue or, alternatively, by the level of culpability with which the harm-
ful conduct is undertaken. Accordingly, as Anthony Dillof"' notes, hate
crime laws may be justified on retributivist grounds in one of two ways.
First, such laws may be justified if it can be demonstrated that the en-
hanced penalties associated with bias-motivated crimes correspond to
the greater wrongdoing that results from the crimes themselves.1 12 Alter-
natively, such enhanced penalties may be justified if hate-motivated
crimes imply greater culpability on the part of those who perpetrate
them than do crimes that do not implicate concerns about social equal-
ity.' 53 According to Dillof, neither of these claims is sustainable."15
Dillof begins by disposing of the idea that a greater wrong is neces-
sarily perpetrated against a person when s/he is "discriminatorily"
violated by another than when s/he suffers random violation."' The
claim here is a straightforward one: because each human life is morally
equal in weight, one cannot assign greater wrongdoing to the violation
of one person's rights than is assigned to the violation of another's."' It is
only justifiable to trace greater levels of wrongdoing to the characteris-
tics of the victim if it can be said that those characteristics are indicative
of greater protectable rights or interests. Unless advocates of bias crime
legislation are prepared to say that members of one group-in this case,
gay men and lesbians-have greater rights than those who fall outside of
that group, the wrongdoing variant of the retributive justification must
fail."' Clearly, such an argument is inconsistent with the other political
150. MooRE, supra note 105, at 179.
151. Anthony Dillof, Punishing Bias: An Examination of the Theoretical Foundations of Bias
Crime Statutes, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 1015, 1032 (1997).
152. Id. at 1036.
153. Id. at 1063.
154. Id. at 1032.
155. Id. at 1034-36.
156. Id. at 1034.
157. To be fair, there is another (perhaps more common) invocation of the greater wrong-
doing claim: that each hate crime amounts to greater wrongdoing because of the
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claims of gay and lesbian advocates of bias/hate crime legislation-for
example, the assertion that gay and lesbian people are morally and so-
cially equal to heterosexuals and therefore deserving of equal legal rights.
Indeed, such an articulation of the retributivist argument for hate crime
legislation would seem to lend support to the "special rights" discourse
that, as noted above, has been so ubiquitous in efforts to deny legal
rights and benefits to gay men and lesbians.
Dillof's claim that this rendition of the wrongdoing justification for
hate crime legislation fails is therefore persuasive as far as it goes. Yet it
seems to bypass the very essence of the argument advocates of bias crime
legislation offer on its behalf: such legislation is needed to redress the
political, social, and legal devaluation of the lives the statutes seek to
protect. In other words, while Dillof assumes an equal moral playing
field in evaluating his hypothetical matching crimes (one committed
because of the victim's social identity, the other committed without the
attendant bias), advocates of bias crime legislation assume a profoundly
unbalanced terrain. On this view, the retributive satisfaction that one
experiences upon the enhanced punishment of a bias-motivated of-
fender is derived in significant part from the sense that a larger social
wrong (here homophobia) has been partly righted.
This claim is not one grounded in notions of distributive justice,
however.5 It does not envision a "grand moral chalkboard," upon
which individual rights and wrongs are recorded in opposing columns,
to be summed up at some discrete point in time to arrive at the aggre-
gate balance of justice. Instead, the moral and political calculation is
specific to the individual victim and perpetrator: this victim deserves this
(additional) measure of justice, and this perpetrator deserves this (sub-
tracted) measure of privilege." 9 One can easily contend that this calculus
secondary harms that typically attend such an offense. See generally Berrill & Herek,
supra note 25. For example, advocates point to the harm inflicted on an entire com-
munity by a single hate- or bias-motivated attack. One need not deny the evidence
suggesting the terroristic quality of hate crimes to dispose of this justificatory claim.
As Dillof notes, this argument fails because it supports punishment by proxy where
there is no reason to believe that such harms could not be directly addressed by the
criminal law. See Dillof, supra note 151, at 1050-55. Bias crime legislation, on this
view, tends toward both over- and under-inclusiveness. See id. at 1055-61; see also
Heidi M. Hurd, Why Liberals Should Hate "Hate Crime Legislation," 20 LAW & PHIL.
215, 215-32 (2001); Hurd & Moore, supra note 3.
158. See generally Alon Harel & Gideon Parchomovsky, On Hate and Equality, 109 YALE
L.J. 507 (1999).
159. For example, consider this observation attributed to Judy Shepard, whose son was
killed in what has been widely characterized as an anti-gay hate crime: "Matt is no
longer with us today because the men who killed him learned to hate. Somehow and
somewhere they received the message that the lives of gay people are not as worthy of
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assumes too much (that the victim has experienced injustice and that
the perpetrator has experienced privilege). Failing evidence of actual ex-
periences, the attempt to measure wrongdoing in this way may amount
to finding wrongdoing in the mere increased risk of harm, as Hurd and
Moore have argued. 1o Advocates of hate crime legislation counter that
individual victims and perpetrators are the products of social forces of
inequality. Whether individuals experience in a conscious way their rela-
tive levels of oppression or privilege is irrelevant to whether it actually
exists. Indeed, the very fact of the crime itself provides prima facie evi-
dence of the victim's socially constituted vulnerability and the
perpetrator's socially constituted sense of entitlement.16 , Thus, one
might wish to reframe this debate in social, rather than moral, terms.
Herein lies the rub.
If the perpetrator is socially constituted as such, s/he cannot be held
morally responsible for his or her actions unless there is some other
source of culpability beyond the mere enactment of a homophobic
script. Put another way, solving the wrongdoing question in this way
only begs the question of why criminals who commit their offenses in a
manner evincing homophobia are more deserving of blame and pun-
ishment than those who commit them without such attendant
motivations. We are thus directed to the second type of retributivist ar-
gument that may be raised in favor of bias crime legislation: that based
on the culpability of the offender. In contrast to the wrongdoing-based
claim, the culpability-based claim measures desert by the accountability
of the offender, rather than by the harm produced by his or her conduct.
The emphasis on culpability represents the state's recognition that
equivalent wrongs may be attended by varying levels of accountability
and responsibility. While intuitively sensible, this narrative of justifica-
tion raises an important and difficult prior question: on what principle
may we distinguish between levels of culpability?
In asking this question, we are again made aware of the difficulties
that emerge from the failure of the legislation's advocates to articulate a
coherent account of what a hate crime is.162 To begin, there is the
respect, dignity and honor as the lives of other people." HRC Hate Crimes, supra
note 97. The enhanced penalty associated with hate-motivated criminal conduct thus
is a punishment for the bias-driven devaluation of the victim, an act that is deemed an
independent wrong.
160. Hurd & Moore, supra note 3, at 1139.
161. Introduction, supra note 31, at 1-3.
162. Much of the scholarship on anti-gay hate crime law fails to address this question in
any satisfying way. Jack Levin and Jack McDevitt suggest that some crimes are obvi-
ously hate crimes, or that one can identify hate crimes on the basis of certain
common characteristics (i.e., they tend to be more violent, they often involve groups
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question of whether the legislation at issue is designed to operate upon
hate, bias, or some combination of the two. Advocates frequently move
back and forth between references to "bias" and "hate" in describing the
characteristics of the conduct that the legislation seeks to prohibit, indi-
cating (by this linguistic inconsistency) that they have not yet
established their justificatory allegiances.163
However, there is a second, more ominous, problem lurking behind
this linguistic slippage. It may be the case that bias and hatred are not
sufficiently distinguishable for purposes of articulating a theory of why
the presence of one or the other might justifiably give rise to particularly
harsh criminal sanctions. Or, at the very least, it may be that we have yet
to develop a sustainable theory of how they differ from each other and
operate together to produce the necessary degree of culpability. In short,
advocates have yet to solve the most basic chicken-and-egg questions
underlying the justification for bias crime statutes. Advocates have
tended to gloss the issue by asserting simply that, where bias and hatred
are found together in the commission of a crime, they create a synergis-
tic effect that renders the resulting offense worse in some way than it
otherwise would have been. Whether it is bias that feeds hatred, or ha-
tred that finds particular expression in bias, or whether the two are
of offenders, etc.). See JACK LEVIN & JACK McDEvrrr, HATE CRIMES REVISITED:
AMERICA'S WAR ON THOSE WHO ARE DIFFERENT 13, 17-22 (2002). But this ap-
proach begs the question. What makes a crime "obviously" a hate crime is that there
has already been created a socially meaningful category-hate crime-that then de-
fines its contents. And determining which crimes count as hate crimes by describing
the characteristics of average hate crimes is plainly tautological. Jenness and colleagues
rightly point out that there is no simple one-to-one "mirror" between the material re-
ality of hate crime and what is legally, socially, and politically recognized as hate
crime. See JENNESS & GRATTET, supra note 15, at 10; JENNESS & BROAD, supra note
15, at 7. While some scholars, such as JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 15, find this ob-
servation to be fundamentally damning to the very notion of hate crimes, id. at 6, I
think it signals only that it is crucial for us to determine how those legal, social, and
political definitions are fleshed out via the justificatory discourses under examination
here.
163. The terms "bias" and "hate" can function as a kind of shorthand in referencing spe-
cific justificatory frameworks. The use of the phrase "hate crime" may be strategically
intended to highlight the egregious and indefensible quality of such crimes, thus em-
phasizing the culpability of the offender and resting on a retributivist rationale.
Political advocacy groups, such as the HRC and the National Gay and Lesbian Task
Force, prefer this terminology when speaking to their constituents. HRC Hate
Crimes, supra note 97; NGLTF Hate Crimes, supra note 98. The use of the phrase
"bias crime," on the other hand, lends itself more comfortably to expressivist and
utilitarian claims. Legislatures almost always use the term "bias," perhaps deeming it a
more appropriate object of legislative disapproval or (alternatively) a more amenable
object of the apparatus of deterrence.
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unintelligible in isolation from one another, has not been a question
advocates have addressed head-on.
Moreover, it is here that justifications based on wrongdoing and
culpability seem to fade into one another. For example, one common
argument on behalf of hate crime laws states that enhanced penalties are
warranted because hate crimes tend to be more violent and/or tend to
produce greater psychological harm in their victims.'6 Putting aside the
empirical uncertainties associated with this claim,16' a key weakness of
the argument is that it relies upon a conflation of what the victim per-
ceives or experiences and what the mental state of the perpetrator is.
According to Hurd and Moore, this argument uses the mental state of
the perpetrator as a proxy to indicate the allegedly greater harm experi-
enced by the victim when such harm is (a) already used directly as a
means of elevating the severity of a crime and (b) is better measured di-
rectly on a case-by-case basis than via a blanket rule enhancing all
penalties based on the culpability of the perpetrator.16
There are several other ways in which one might conceive of the re-
lationship between hatred and bias in the anatomy of an anti-gay crime,
however. One possibility is that hatred and bias are coexisting mental
states of significant duration. Unlike action-relative mental states
(such as intentionality and knowledge), hatred and bias function to-
gether as a kind of foundational cognitive or emotive terrain, upon
which particular encounters are played out with more or less predictable
consequences. If this account is to be believed, there is no more justifica-
tion for attributing culpability to the presence or absence of bias and
hatred than there is for attributing it to one's tendency to be suspicious
of strangers (because, say, one was raised in New York rather than a
small town in the Midwest). Such dispositions are, as Hurd claims, at
best only indirectly subject to volitional control, and are therefore ille-
gitimate bases upon which to assign culpability.16 1
Advocates of hate crime legislation probably have an alternative
view of the relationship between bias and hatred in mind, however. As
Frederick Lawrence has argued, the hatred that bias crime statutes target
is distinguishable from the sort of individual-specific hatred that, for
example, is deemed to operate in incidents of violence where the
164. See Iganski, supra note 31.
165. JACOBS & POTTER, supra note 15, ch. 4. But see Howard J. Ehrlich, Barbara E.
Larcom & Robert D. Purvis, The Traumatic Impact of Ethnoviolence, in THE PRICE
WE PAY: THE CASE AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRA-
PHY 62, 66 (Laura J. Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995).
166. Hurd & Moore, supra note 3, at 1086.
167. See Hurd, supra note 157, at 219-24.
168. See id. at 224-26.
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perpetrator and the victim are known to each other personally. In a bias
crime, bias operates as the dispositional state, while hatred appears as an
emotion specific to the circumstances. The mechanism operates some-
thing like this: generalized bias against the group is condensed via the
emotion of hatred, which is directed toward a particular group-
identified victim."' Hatred, in this sense, is a vehicle through which bias
operates as a kind of prior, foundational mental state.
How accurate is this model of the workings of hate and bias? Let us
start with an ostensibly simpler question: how certain are we that bias-
motivated crime even requires the presence of hatred for its accom-
plishment?O On one level, it seems incontestable that the ability to
physically violate another person requires that the perpetrator suspend
his or her belief in the victim's fundamental humanity. Hatred is one
way of accomplishing this. Rage is another. The key process seems to be
objectification, whereby one person becomes an object upon which an-
other's passions may find their fullest expression. Yet objectification is a
poor indicator of the emotion that underlies it. If certain feminist and
object relations theorists171 are to be believed, sexual desire may be the
most common form of objectification that we observe in contemporary
societies. Certainly advocates of hate crime legislation would not con-
tend that all expressions of objectification are culpable.
If this is so, then the claim must proceed along the lines that only
some kinds of objectification are reprehensible and that we can identify
what they are and when they occur. Thus it is not the objectification per
se that is culpable, but the quality of objectification, which is another
way of saying we are interested in passions. Yet can we be responsible for
the passions we feel?17 2 To attribute responsibility in this way, we would
(at a minimum) have to be confident that we had properly identified the
169. See LAWRENCE, supra note 31, at 9.
170. Jenness and Grattet contend that it is a measure of the influence of activist groups
that hatred may be disappearing as a required element of the offense. See JENNESS &
GRATTET, supra note 15, at 112-19.
171. See, e.g., Jessica Benjamin, Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, in
POWERS OF DESIRE: THE POLITICS OF SEXUALITY 280, 283 (Ann Snitow et al. eds.,
1983).
172. About this, Moore has written,
We can no more choose which emotion it will be that causes our judg-
ments or actions than we can choose the reason for which we act. We can
choose whether to act or not and whether to judge one way or another, but
we cannot make it be true that some particular reason or emotion caused
our action or our judgment. We must look inward as best we can to detect,
but not to will, which emotions bring about our judgments; and here there
is plenty of room for error and self-deception.
Moore in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 105, at 90.
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passions in play. Yet evidence suggests this may be a problem not only
because emotions leave unreliable evidentiary trails in their wake, but
also because they may not be identifiable even to the person who experi-
ences them.173
Empirical difficulties aside, there is a bigger problem lurking
here-one that emerges as a result of the ways in which law disciplines
the evidentiary boundaries within which hate crime cases may be adju-
dicated. That is, law uses a mechanical approach to identify the presence
of hatred as a motivation through the deployment of proxy measures.
Thus, the inquiry is constructed as a series of questions: was the defen-
dant "heterosexual"? How do we know? Was the victim "gay"? How do
we know? How did the defendant know? What conduct occurred be-
tween the victim and the defendant such that we can infer the existence
of a particular emotional state existing within the defendant?"'
The use of categorical assignments to identify an underlying emo-
tional dynamic is an unremarkable feature of law, but it is terribly
consequential when law is envisioned as a vehicle of progressive sexual
politics. The danger of such a strategy may be readily discerned by ex-
amining the way in which hate crime causation inquiries open
additional space for the deployment of a defense strategy that takes up,
reinscribes, and authorizes an especially pernicious account predicated
upon the binary matrix: the so-called homosexual panic defense.
V. AMBIVALENT DISCOURSES OF DESIRE AND IDENTITY: THE
HOMOSEXUAL PANIc DEFENSE
The homosexual panic defense (HPD) is a claim frequently offered
on behalf of those accused of committing crimes against gay men or les-
bians."' Sometimes called "homosexual panic" or "gay panic," and
173. See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 110, at 284.
174. See, e.g., In re M.S., 896 P.2d 1365, 1369 (Cal. 1995) (noting that the alleged attack
occurred in a gay neighborhood and that victims "were homosexual"); People v. Wil-
liams, No. 272779, 2007 WL 4179322, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2007)
(noting that trial court erred in characterizing crime as a hate crime because "[wihile
the fact that the victim was a homosexual could be verified, whether defendant shot
the victim because of his sexual orientation could not, particularly where defendant
maintained that he was not the shooter"); People v. Diaz, 727 N.Y.S.2d 298, 299
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2001) (noting defendant sought out "a gay man" and attacked a man
near a gay bar whom he "perceived to be a gay man").
175. See also Howe's analysis of how the American HPD framework has been imported
into Australian courts via the "provocation" defense. Adrian Howe, Homosexual Ad-
vances in Law: Murderous Excuse, Pluralized Ignorance and the Privilege of Unknowing,
in SEXUALITY IN THE LEGAL ARENA 84-89 (C.F. Stychin & D. Herman eds., 2000).
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sometimes referred to as "homosexual advance" claims, the defense may
be offered to establish diminished capacity, or to negate mens rea (via a
claim of provocation)."' It is only very rarely effective as a complete de-
fense, but defendants continue to raise some variant of the defense with
regularity in an effort to reduce their criminal liability.17 ' The specific
arguments advanced can vary, but the essential claim of a clinically accu-
rate case of HPD is that the motivating force in the attack was the
perpetrator's own latent, disavowed, homosexual desire, which became
unmanageable in the face of some conduct by the victim' and in turn
exploded into violence."' One of Matthew Shepard's killers, Aaron
McKinney, made a claim similar to this.8 o
176. See, e.g., Smith v. Rogerson, 171 F.3d 569 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Bautista,
145 F.3d 1140 (10th Cir. 1998); Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157 (D.
Utah 1999); State v. Harris, 130 P.3d 1247 (Kan. Ct. App. 2006) (unpublished
opinion); State v. Campbell, 617 S.E.2d 1 (N.C. 2005); State v. Laws, 481 S.E.2d
641 (N.C. 1997); Black v. Class, 560 N.W.2d 544 (S.D. 1997).
177. See, e.g., Bautista, 145 F.3d 1140; United States v. McGee, 29 F.3d 625 (5th Cit.
1994); Parsons, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 1157; Commonwealth v. Pierce, 642 N.E.2d 579
(Mass. 1994).
178. This may be a sexual advance by the victim visited upon the perpetrator or it may be
something the victim does in complete ignorance of the presence of the perpetrator.
For example, in one well-publicized case, a man who had shot two lesbians camping
in the Adirondacks claimed he did so after he became enraged upon spying them
making love in their tent. He argued that he was particularly susceptible to such
panic because, inter alia, he believed that his mother had been a lesbian. Common-
wealth v. Carr, 580 A.2d 1362 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). It is worth noting that it is
quite rare that the defense is used in precisely this form. Indeed, as noted in a trench-
ant critique by Gary Comstock, most defense attorneys seem to pick and choose
aspects of the clinical diagnosis of "homosexual panic" in an effort to produce an ac-
count of the crime that they hope will resonate with the fact-finder. Comstock, supra
note 4, at 89. In short, they attempt to produce a heteronormative account of the
crime that emphasizes the danger presented by an unwelcome homosexual advance.
Ironically, there is evidence that this account is less and less resonant with finders of
fact. See Michael A. Smyth, Queers and Provocateurs: Hegemony, Ideology, and the
"HomosexualAdvance"Defense, 40 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 903, 904, 926 (2006).
179. There is a justification version of this defense and an excuse version. The justification
version ("provocation") is the one that really gets under the skin of gay men and les-
bians, because it seeks to establish that violence is the socially appropriate response to
uninvited sexual attention from a gay person. The excuse version makes a less ambi-
tious claim, stating something akin to temporary insanity (or diminished capacity) as
a result of overwhelming, confusing, sexual stimulation.
180. Aaron McKinney's lawyers argued that Shepard made an advance toward McKinney,
which sparked a series of memories in McKinney, including one of childhood sexual
abuse and another of consensual sex at the age of fifteen. See Dave Cullen, Gay Panic,
SALON NEWS, Oct. 26, 1999, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/1999/10/26/trial/.
It was humiliation and a relived sensation of vulnerability, they argued, that caused
McKinney to lash out in violence against Shepard. Associated Press, 'Gay Panic'De-
fense Can't Be Used in Murder Trial: Judge Rules that Wyoming Law Doesn't Allow
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The homosexual panic defense, while displaying decreased effec-
tiveness as a complete defense to anti-gay violence, may paradoxically be
reinvigorated by the adjudication of hate crime allegations. While hate
crime laws imagine a crisp distinction between desire and hatred, invo-
cation of the defense draws the fact finder's attention to the complex
nature of sexual desire as a motivating emotion. Desire, as we under-
stand it-and as it has been constructed by those representing the
interests of sexual minorities-is a simultaneously personal and social
phenomenon. We are neither fully determined by it (think: "gay people
are just like everyone else"), nor are we free to disregard it (think: "we do
not choose our sexuality"). Yet if this is so, on what ground might one
claim the authority to punish the Aaron McKinneys of the world for the
complex mixture of sexual desires that serve to motivate their behaviors?
One response is that, even conceding that Aaron McKinney experienced
some complicated and alienating form of desire in the moment before
he first struck Matthew Shepard, his conduct was really the product of
his hatred, not of his desire. But to say this is to engage in a fictive disar-
ticulation of the emotive and cognitive motivations that result in anti-
gay violence. Not only can a court or jury not "know" whether Aaron
McKinney felt mostly hatred or mostly desire before he killed Matthew
Shepard, it might also be worth considering the implications of inviting
such a judgment for the regulation of other complicated forms of pas-
sion.
VI. CONCLUSION: THIS IS NOT YOUR
POST-MODERN LEGAL SYSTEM
Though one might hold open the hope that hatred and desire
might be accurately identified as motive forces in anti-gay criminal con-
duct, LGB activists should be particularly skeptical of the ability of
courts and juries to get this right. This is because, in adjudicating such
Such a Strategy; Defense Rests Case, as reprinted in ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 2,
1999, at A3, available at 1999 WLNR 934086. As Comstock has argued, this defense
did not cohere with a clinical diagnosis of homosexual panic; rather, the defense
strategy appears to have been to link social approbation of pedophilia with the specter
of an unwanted homosexual advance. The trial court precluded McKinney's lawyers
from pursuing the defense qua defense. However, the defense was able to offer evi-
dence that Matthew Shepard had made unwelcome sexual advances to other men,
and did allege a "homosexual advance" claim in closing arguments. McKinney was
nonetheless convicted and, in 2004, gave an interview to a television newsmagazine
in which he claimed the "gay panic" claim was a fabrication. See Virginia Heffernan,
Was Killing of Shepard an Anti-gay Hate Crime?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at El,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/26/arts/television/26heff.html.
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cases, finders of fact regularly rely upon popular conceptions of sexual
dualism."' Specifically, they assumel8 several things about the nature of
human sexuality: (a) that it is organized exclusively around the sex of the
desired object; (b) that it is fixed and stable; and (c) that categories of
sexual attraction are mutually exclusive. Additionally, as discussed above,
they assume that desire and animus are mutually exclusive states of hu-
man emotion. Thus: (a) one is attracted to either men or women;
(b) this orientation (once determined) is the essential truth of the per-
son; 83 (c) one cannot be simultaneously heterosexual and homosexual;"'
and (d) evidence of animus precludes a finding of sexual desire.'85 Nor
181. See, e.g., Parsons v. Galetka, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1157 (D. Utah 1999) (rejecting
homosexual advance claim where evidence showed victim had heterosexual relation-
ships and autopsy "showed no evidence of anal sexuality"); Cuevas v. Florida, 770 So.
2d 703, 704-05 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (noting sufficiency of evidence in hate
crime plea where, according to the state, victim was a "declared lesbian" and was
therefore "part of the statutory protected class"); People v. Williams, No. 272779,
2007 WL 4179322, at *4 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2007) (unpublished opinion);
People v. Ortiz, 48 A.D.3d 1112 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (evidence sufficient to estab-
lish hate crime where defendants were strangers to victims, crime was unprovoked,
defendants began to beat victims after inquiring about victims' relationship and re-
peatedly made derogatory comments concerning sexual orientation of victims); In re
John V., 820 N.Y.S.2d 490 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2006) (use of epithet "faggot" by defen-
dant insufficient evidence of hate motivation, where there was no evidence that
victim was a homosexual or that defendant perceived him to be a homosexual).
182. Note that often this means simply accepting categorical descriptions and identities
(gay, homosexual, heterosexual, etc.) as evidence of a stable, prediscursive ontological
reality (that a defendant or victim was, or was not, likely to have engaged in sexual or
non-sexual or aggressive behavior in a given interaction with the defendant/victim,
given his or her categorical assignment). See cases cited supra note 181. In prior re-
search, I have found a similar dynamic operative in same-sex sexual harassment cases.
This is not surprising, as anti-harassment law embodies a causation requirement that
is virtually identical to that embodied in hate crime law. See generally Zylan, supra
note 15.
183. See generally FoucAULT, supra note 100 (describing the emergence of the modern
conception of homosexuality as a source of identity and personal truth).
184. One might object here and say, "But what about bisexuality?", at which point, I
would point out the lack of acceptance of the notion that bisexuality is a real, inde-
pendent category of sexual identity (rather than a transitional state from one pole to
the other). See Paul, supra note 93.
185. Let me anticipate an objection here, which is that there are many cases demonstrating
that courts can simultaneously find animus and desire. In cases of workplace sexual
battery, for example, courts frequently find it possible to reconcile evidence of vio-
lence and evidence of the assailant's sexual desire. This is due to a specific doctrinal
influence, however: the influence of Catharine MacKinnon's theory of sex/gender
violence in shaping workplace harassment law. See Zylan, supra note 15. Per
MacKinnon, where men and women are concerned, the fact that sexual behavior may
take an aggressive or even violent form is unremarkable; the sexual element is pre-
sumed by the very fact that the incident involves a male aggressor and a female target.
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should we be surprised to see these tropes deployed in legal discourse.
Law as a set of structured institutions necessarily delimits the field of
sexual and social possibility. There may be opportunities for postmodern
identity deconstruction elsewhere in the modern American state, but
law is hardly a promising place in which to find them. 1 6
Arguably, the presumption against finding sexual desire where a
nominally heterosexual person physically violates a person of the same
sex should work in favor of a finding of liability in hate crime cases. This
would reverse the usual fortunes of gay and lesbian people and-on that
basis-might be said to auger well for the community. But at what price
would the "right" outcome be purchased in hate crime cases? At a
minimum, the adjudication of such cases would require that courts en-
dorse the model of sexual dualism outlined above. That model-
serviceable in certain respects-may be the very source of much anti-gay
discrimination and violence. Return again to the claims of the homo-
sexual panic defense. More than anything else, HPD tells us that an
individual's investment in a fixed, polar, and unassailable sexual orienta-
tion can be experienced as a matter of life and death. To the extent that
the boundary between heterosexual and homosexual is deemed a
fundamental signifier of selffhood, should anyone be surprised that some
people will go as far as murder in order to define it publicly and conclu-
sively? Certainly gay and lesbian people deny this consequence of sexual
dualism only at the cost of appearing disingenuous."' We also do so at
our collective peril.
The intuitive perception that there is something particularly wrong
and culpable in the commission of a hate crime is eminently reasonable.
We recognize that such crimes are qualitatively different from other
Where, however, the parties are two men or two women, the sexual element must be
proved, because it cannot-within a social context that renders heterosexuality the de-
fault sexual state-be presumed. MAcKINNON, supra note 65, at 126-54. As Justice
Scalia noted in Oncale v. Sundowner Ofbihore Oil, the landmark case addressing same-
sex harassment: "Courts and juries have found the inference of discrimination easy to
draw in most male-female sexual harassment situations, because the challenged con-
duct typically involves explicit or implicit proposals of sexual activity; it is reasonable
to assume those proposals would not have been made to someone of the same sex."
523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998).
186. See generally WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND FREEDOM IN LATE
MODERNITY (1995); HALLEY, supra note 66; LEFr LEGALISM/LEFT CRITIQUE, Supra
note 9.
187. One way of describing contemporary social movements for gay and lesbian equality is
as public efforts to assert the importance of sexuality as a feature of personal identity.
Of course, the essential tension within gay and lesbian politics is that between assert-
ing sexuality's primacy and asserting its irrelevance. This is not, by any means, a
settled debate. All the more reason, in my view, to recognize the inherent indetermi-
nacy of any account of sexual motivation.
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offenses, and that they tend to inflict a particular injury on those com-
munities of which the victim is a member. Yet this intuitive response
must be critically examined if retributivist justifications are not to de-
volve into expressions of unreasoned vengeance. Criminal codes and
procedures afford us adequate tools to express social condemnation of
brutal, vicious, and otherwise harmful crimes-whatever the particular
quality or source of the brutality, viciousness, or harm. Advocates of gay
and lesbian equality can and should organize to pressure law enforce-
ment agencies to investigate crimes committed against gay men and
lesbians and to vigorously and equitably enforce the criminal law. We
can and should draw public attention to all events (including crimes)
that highlight or symbolize the persistence of anti-gay animus or homo-
phobia.
At the same time, however, the criminal law ought not to codify
and reify the construct: "anti-gay hate crime." In spite of the best inten-
tions of lawmakers, courts, and advocates, anti-gay hate crime laws
paradoxically constrain and thwart the pursuit of sexual justice by chan-
neling complex and indeterminate facts into categorical conceptions of
human experience and identity. The justificatory narratives underlying
punishment for "anti-gay hate crimes" are internally contradictory at
best. Even if one is not concerned about the integrity of the moral justi-
fications for criminal sanctions, it is worth considering the long-term
consequences of discursive choices. If courts and juries are asked to
make determinations of criminal liability and punishment based on im-
poverished conceptions of sexual motivation, it is virtually assured that
they will do so in a way that replicates the very hegemonic models that
serve as the foundation of anti-gay violence and discrimination. While
one may experience certain retributive satisfactions along the way, it is
worth considering the price at which such satisfactions will be pur-
chased. t
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